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Abstract: The legitimacy of the United Nations is essential to its effectiveness in carrying out 
its mandate. As UN organs exercise an increasing array of ‘governmental’ powers, it should 
come as no surprise that repeated failures by the UN to provide adequate due process to those 
affected by its decision-making has had a detrimental effect on the Organization and its 
activities. Yet UN organs continue to resist procedural reform, seemingly unpersuaded by 
reform proposals insisting that due process is unquestionably ‘a good thing’. The aim of this 
article is to develop procedural principles for the UN context using a normatively rich rather 
than formalistic approach. The problem in relying on traditional international law source 
methodology — drawing on ‘universally-recognized’ procedural standards from customary 
international human rights law or ‘general principles’ of domestic public law — is that it 
ignores the contextual nature of due process. The article lays the foundations of a ‘value-based’ 
approach to the development of due process principles for the UN context, with a focus on 
two sites in which the choice of procedural framework is both problematic and unresolved: the 
targeted sanctions context and the Haiti cholera controversy.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
‘…hard it is for high and stately buildings long to stand, except they be upholden  
and staid by most strong shores, and rest upon most sure foundations…’ 
                                                                                         Jean Bodin, The Six Books of a Commonweale [1576], 517 
 
It has been said of the redemptive quality of procedural reform that it is ‘about 
nine parts myth and one part coconut oil’.1 Yet there is little myth or copra in 
recognition that failure by the United Nations to provide adequate procedural 
justice has had a detrimental effect on the Organization and its activities. In the 
targeted sanctions context, litigation in over thirty national and regional courts 
over due process deficiencies has had a ‘significant impact on the regime’ placing it 
‘at a legal crossroads’.2 In the peacekeeping context, the UN’s position that claims 
in the ongoing Haiti cholera controversy are ‘not receivable’ has been described in 
extensive and uniformly critical press coverage as the ‘UN’s Watergate, except 
with far fewer consequences for the people responsible’ and led to the initiation of 
class action tort claims in US courts.3 Complacency in the face of allegations of 
sexual abuse by UN blue helmets led to the unprecedented ousting of a special 
representative to the Secretary-General in the Central African Republic. 
Economizing on due process standards is proving to be false economy. 
The focus of this article is not to repeat the allegation of due process 
deficiencies. The ‘j’accuse’ moment was seized by a range of academics and 
practitioners, but has passed. The task now facing international lawyers is more 
structural. The controversy and transnational discourse surrounding due process is 
symptomatic of the fact that UN decision-making is emerging as a new tier of 
governance applicable and accountable to a complex and hybrid global 
constituency. Yet there is still much normative work to be done in tracing out the 
full implications of the assumption of ‘governmental’ powers of decision-making 
in the international sphere. In terms of applicable procedural standards, the 
problem is that the normative case for the adoption of due process safeguards in 
UN decision-making has not adequately been made. Instead, would-be reformers 
have relied on a presumption that due process is unquestionably ‘a good thing’, 
with minimal analysis of the form it should take or the role we require it to play in 
the UN setting. At the same time, and without adequate normative justification, 
                                                      
1 Joseph L. Sax, The (Unhappy) Truth About NEPA, 26 OKLA. L. REV. 239, 239 (1973).  
2 Thirteenth report of 1267 Monitoring Team, UN doc S/2012/968, [19] (Dec. 31, 2012); Eighth Report 
of the 1267 Monitoring Team, UN Doc S/2008/324, [39] (May 14, 2008).  
3 How the UN Caused a Massive Cholera Outbreak in Haiti, BUSINESS INSIDER, Apr. 9, 2015. See also Fault-
Lines: Haiti in a Time of Cholera, AL JAZEERA television broadcast, Mar. 2, 2015; United in Immunity: UN in 
the Dock over Haiti Cholera Outbreak, FRANCE 24 television broadcast Oct. 14, 2014; The UN condemns Baby 
Doc but exonerates itself, ECONOMIST, Mar. 2, 2013; How the UN Caused Haiti’s Cholera Crisis — and Won’t be 
Held Responsible, THE ATLANTIC, Feb. 26, 2013.  
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the UN rests on its traditional privileges such as primacy or immunity, resisting 
outside ‘interference’ with its decision-making in the form of procedural regulation 
and review. 
This article proceeds from the starting point that the intransigence on the part 
of both sides of the due process debate is less a product of ideology about the 
virtue or otherwise of due process, and more a question of (flawed) methodology. 
In the reform debate, the task of developing a procedural framework for the UN 
setting has been largely a-theoretical. International lawyers have predominantly 
followed traditional international law source methodology, drawing ‘universally-
recognized’ procedural standards from customary international law or general 
principles of civilized nations based on the recognition of such standards in ‘x’ 
number of treaties, or the representation of similar principles in ‘y’ number of 
states. This has led, on the one hand, to those favouring reform uniting around the 
need for a judicial remedy, drawing on due process guarantees binding on states 
under international and regional human rights sources. On the other hand, the UN 
staunchly rejects the idea of a judicial remedy. 
This formalistic ‘one-size-fits-all’ approach to due process (or its blanket 
rejection) lacks normative foundation. As any public lawyer will readily identify, 
while due process rights are recognised by most legal systems, this should not lead 
us into the error of thinking either that this makes the principles ‘universal’ or that 
they take the same ‘judicial’ shape in every legal system.4 In the domestic literature, 
it is well established that due process is contextual: different legal contexts 
legitimately require different procedural standards and operate according to 
different principles and values.5 The netting of similar principles from an array of 
different legal systems in accordance with traditional international law source 
methodology results in the artificial generation of a universally applicable set of 
norms that does not sit comfortably with the contextual nature of due process. 
The aim of this article is to develop procedural principles for the UN context 
using a normatively rich rather than formalistic approach. In the following pages, I 
lay out the foundations of a ‘value-based’ approach to the development of due 
process principles for the UN context, with a focus on two sites in which the 
choice of procedural framework is both problematic and unresolved: the targeted 
sanctions context and the Haiti cholera controversy. In both settings, a range of 
procedural frameworks have been proposed and applied, with certain mechanisms 
imposed by the UN itself, others embedded in reform proposals and still others 
evolving more organically. The aim is to consider the main procedural frameworks 
in terms of the due process model they most appropriately advance. Through a 
value-based approach, the aim is to move the due process debate on beyond its 
current deadlock, leapfrogging the superficial debate about form or remedy, and 
                                                      
4 Carol Harlow, Global Administrative Law: The Quest for Principles and Values, 17 EUR. J. INT’L L. 187, 204 
(2006). 
5 One of the foremost comparative treatises on due process notes that ‘there is no general blueprint to 
follow and the variety of approaches found in statutes is considerable’: D. J. GALLIGAN, DUE PROCESS 
AND FAIR PROCEDURES: A STUDY OF ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES (1996), 315.  
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exposing underlying choices about conceptions of international community, the 
role of law and the appropriate balance between international values.  
 
 
 
1. A VALUE-BASED APPROACH: THREE MODELS OF DUE 
PROCESS 
 
Even within domestic legal systems, it was felt historically that insufficient 
attention had been paid to the theoretical aspects of procedures, reflecting a 
sentiment that procedural rules relate ‘only to the nuts and bolts of legal 
machinery, whereas central theoretical issues lie elsewhere’.6 However, the vast 
literature on the subject in the last few decades reflects that the theoretical 
dimension of due process is extraordinarily rich. This literature has been virtually 
untapped in the debate about the application of due process to the UN setting. 
Instead, it has been common in the international debate to discuss due process in 
terms of a set of procedural rights, including (1) the right to notice; (2) the right to 
a hearing; (3) the right to reasons; (4) the right of appeal to an independent 
tribunal; (5) the right of public access to information and (6) the right to a judicial 
remedy. In proposing applicable procedural standards, little consideration has 
been given to the centralizing theoretical foundations that bind the constituent 
standards of due process to the broader concept, in particular the purpose or 
purposes underlying this set of rights. Yet due process is far more than the sum of 
its parts. An important aim of this value-based analysis is to demonstrate that due 
process is more than a set of discrete legal standards, but is a touchstone for the 
way in which a particular legal order conceives of far larger issues.  
 
1.1. DUE PROCESS: HISTORY, POWER AND LEGITIMACY 
 
Due process has played a very important historical role in shaping a society’s legal, 
political and social decision-making structures. Shifts in governmental decision-
making power have often been matched by widespread procedural reform. During 
the eighteenth, nineteenth and twentieth centuries, there was a shift in the centre 
of gravity of governmental authority from the legislative and judicial to the 
administrative branches of government across a range of countries, including the 
United States, England and France. In many cases, this shift in the locus of 
governmental authority was accompanied by crises of legitimacy, generally 
stemming from concerns about the concentration of decision-making authority in 
the hands of unelected officials, and attempts to insulate this authority from 
interference by the judiciary. It was largely through the reformation of due process 
                                                      
6 Gerry Maher, Natural Justice as Fairness in THE LEGAL MIND: ESSAYS FOR TONY HONORÉ 104 (Neil 
MacCormick and Peter Birks eds., 1986). 
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law that these concerns were redressed. In the American context, the elaboration 
of due process principles has been described as the ‘primary mechanism’ for the 
redefinition of the modern administrative state.7 Napoleon’s ‘rejudicialisation’ of 
French administrative justice, through the establishment of the Conseil d’Etat and, 
later, the investiture of the Conseil d’Etat with the power of review over 
administrative decision-making authority, was described by Napoleon as necessary 
or ‘the government will fall into scorn.’8 In the UK, the constitutional significance 
of the House of Lords’ decision in Ridge v Baldwin,9 extending the right of 
procedural fairness to the exercise of all administrative decision-making, is 
expressed in its characterization as the ‘Magna Carta of natural justice.’10  
The idea that due process has served historically to enhance or restore 
legitimacy in the wake of shifts in decision-making authority is an interesting one 
in the present context of UN decision-making. The expanding assumption of 
decision-making authority over individuals by international institutions might be 
viewed as the next important shift in governmental authority, this time from the 
domestic to the international sphere. This shift in the locus of decision-making 
authority has certainly sparked similar concerns to those emerging during the rise 
of the modern administrative state, namely fears about the exercise of power over 
individuals by an unaccountable body and the absence of judicial review. Perceived 
against the backdrop of other historical shifts in governmental decision-making 
authority, failure by the UN to establish adequate due process safeguards 
regulating its assumption of decision-making authority over individuals can be 
recognized as something of an historical anomaly.  
 
1.2. DUE PROCESS AS ‘DIALOGUE’ 
 
Though due process has proved a valuable tool in comparable historical contexts, 
there has been a failure in the international sphere to appreciate the precise way or 
ways in which procedural law can positively contribute to UN decision-making. It 
is often said, and history confirms, that the essential aim of due process is to 
enhance the legitimacy of decision-making.11 Of course, legitimacy is a wide lens. 
If the case for procedural reform is to be persuasive, it is necessary to bring the 
essential contribution of due process into sharper focus.  
I argue that due process serves to establish a ‘peculiar form of dialogue’ in 
decision-making.12 Safeguards associated with due process aim collectively to open 
up a structured dialogue between decision-making authority and those affected by 
                                                      
7 JERRY MASHAW, DUE PROCESS IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE (1985), 1; Richard Stewart, The 
Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1667, 1717–1722 (1975).  
8 PELET DE LA LOZÈRE, OPINIONS DE NAPOLÉON 191 (F Didot 1833).  
9 [1964] AC 40. 
10 C. K. ALLEN, LAW AND ORDERS 242 (3d ed. 1965). 
11 JERRY MASHAW, GREED, CHAOS AND GOVERNANCE 108 (1997); T. M. Scanlon, Due Process, in DUE 
PROCESS 94 (J Roland Pennock and John W Chapman eds., 1977); CAROL HARLOW AND RICHARD 
RAWLINGS, LAW AND ADMINISTRATION 621 (3d ed. 2009). 
12 This expression deliberately mimics Fuller’s discussion of the related concept of adjudication: Lon 
Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication 92 HARV. L. REV. 353, 364 (1978). 
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decisions. Broadly, the aim of this dialogue is to enhance legitimacy. Whether 
‘legitimacy’ is described by reference to a Habermasian ‘worthiness to be 
recognized’,13 a Franckian ‘connection to a community’s evolving standards’14 or 
Beetham’s requirement that decision-making authority should find its foundation 
in ‘beliefs shared by both dominant and subordinate’,15 the concept of legitimacy 
envisages a connection between decision-making authority and community values 
sufficient to ground acceptance of that authority in the relevant community. Due 
process acts in the service of legitimacy by shoring up the connection that acts as 
legitimacy’s source, providing legal standards that serve to establish a dialogue 
between decision-makers and the community affected by decisions to ensure 
decision-making takes place in accordance with relevant community values. Setting 
up this general connection with legitimacy is important because it reveals that due 
process is necessarily intricately bound up with conceptions of community, values 
and the role of law in achieving these values. The contextual nature of due process 
arises from the fact that conceptions of community, law and values will differ 
between legal contexts.  
 
1.3. THREE MODELS OF DUE PROCESS 
 
In developing a normatively rich understanding of due process, it is possible to 
identify a number of distinct schools of thought as to how due process is thought 
to enhance the legitimacy of decision-making. These are commonly discussed in 
terms of process values, with scholars differing over the central process value or 
values advanced by procedural frameworks. While these process values are not 
mutually exclusive and may co-exist, it is helpful to examine them in terms of 
distinct value-based models in order to better appreciate the different ways in 
which due process is able to contribute to legitimacy in decision-making.16  
 
1.3.1. The Instrumentalist Approach: A Model based on Accuracy 
The classical model of due process contributes to the legitimacy of decision-
making by seeking to minimize the incidence of error. This model ascribes an 
instrumental role to due process, regarding it above all as a mechanism by which 
to achieve greater accuracy in the application of the substantive law to the facts. The 
preceding sentence is deliberately qualified: the focus of the instrumentalist model 
is not on achieving accuracy or truth in decision-making per se, but on the 
somewhat narrower aim of ensuring that decision-makers accurately apply the 
substantive law in their decision-making.  
                                                      
13 J. Habermas, Legitimation Problems in the Modern State, in COMMUNICATION AND THE EVOLUTION 
OF SOCIETY 178–9 (T McCarthy trans. 1979). 
14 THOMAS M. FRANCK, FAIRNESS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INSTITUTIONS 26 (1995). 
15 DAVID BEETHAM, THE LEGITIMATION OF POWER (Peter Jones and Albert Weale eds. 1991). 
16 The foundations for these models are outlined in greater detail in DEVIKA HOVELL, THE POWER OF 
PROCESS (2016). 
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Jeremy Bentham, an archetypal positivist, was the original and most 
influential proponent of the instrumental approach to procedural justice. It is 
important not to neglect the link between instrumentalism and legal positivism.17 
Essentially, the primary role of procedural law under this model is to make sure 
that the rules are applied as enacted by the legislature, thus fulfilling the positivist’s 
aim of achieving the accurate and objective implementation of the legislature’s 
will. Of course, under a positivist theory of the rule of law, legitimacy does not 
emerge merely from the accurate application of law, but from a deeper internal 
acceptance of the authority of the law-maker to enact the law. The idea is to 
ensure that unrepresentative bureaucratic decision-makers accurately apply the 
commands of a legitimate source of authority, usually the legislature.18 Crucially, 
the instrumentalist model presupposes the existence of a ‘legitimately 
representative lawmaker’ in the legal system within which the model applies. The 
duty to submit to the rules derives from the legitimacy of the whole compromise 
rather than from that of the particular command.19  
A court-based ‘adjudicatory’ framework has historically been considered as 
best placed to achieve the goals of the instrumentalist model. The model imagines 
a system based on clear and determinate standards, where decision-makers can 
apply these standards instead of their personal notions of fairness, justice or 
appropriateness. In turn, decision-making is amenable to review by a judicial 
arbiter in accordance with these standards to determine whether decisions can be 
counted as correct or incorrect.20  
 
1.3.2. The Dignitarian Approach: A Model Based on Interest Representation 
The quest for accuracy reflected in the instrumentalist approach to due process 
has been overshadowed in more recent times by a competing approach that 
recognizes individual dignity as one of the primary contemporary foundations for 
due process. This model emerged at the domestic level from an increasing sense 
that the accurate application of legislative standards does not define the ‘core ideal’ 
of due process.21 Rather, due process has come to be associated with values 
including ‘basic notions of dignity’,22 ‘humaneness’,23 ‘autonomy, of controlling the 
events that affect you…and the…self-respect that come with it,’24 and as ‘rights to 
                                                      
17 Another celebrated positivist, H. L. A. Hart, described procedural law as the guarantor of impartiality 
and objectivity in the application of legal rules: H. L. A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 156 (1961). 
18 Stewart, supra note 7 at 1672, 1698. 
19 Duncan Kennedy, Legal Formality, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 351, 369 (1973).  
20 Frank I. Michelman, Formal and Associational Aims in Procedural Due Process, in PENNOCK AND CHAPMAN, 
supra note 11 at 130. 
21 Maher, supra note 6.  
22 Richard B. Saphire, Specifying Due Process Values: Toward a More Responsive Approach to Procedural Protection, 
127 U. PA. L. REV. 111, 119 (1978). 
23 Robert Summers, Evaluating and Improving Legal Processes - a Plea for ‘Process Values’ 60 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 
23 (1974). 
24 Edward Dauer and Thomas Gilhool, The Economics of Constitutionalized Repossession 47 S. CAL. L. REV. 
116, 148–9 (1973). 
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interchange [expressing] the idea that to be a person, rather than a thing, is at least 
to be consulted about what is done with one.’25  
There has been much debate about the foundations of a model that translates 
essentially intuitive claims to dignity, self-respect and autonomy into rights.26 The 
obvious candidate is to anchor the dignitarian model in the liberal-democratic 
intellectual tradition, with due process rebranded in terms of a ‘Kantian 
injunction’.27 However, Professor Mashaw’s illuminating scholarship on due 
process has demonstrated the limited determinate value of a dignitarian model of 
due process derived from liberal theory. Ultimately, Mashaw finds that liberal 
theory is either too strong or too weak in its capacity to safeguard the individual.28 
Individual autonomy is either treated as an absolute value, where an individual is 
entitled to demand any process that he or she deems necessary to the pursuit of 
their purposes in life or, according to a more social interpretation of liberal theory, 
is subsumed to the demands of social necessity such that it is enough for decision-
making to be comprehensible to the rational individual in order to avoid a liberal 
critique.29  
Taking into account Mashaw’s criticism, especially as it relates to the 
international legal setting where the role of the individual is in particular danger of 
being subsumed, a more satisfactory theoretical framework in my view is to situate 
the dignitarian approach within a pluralist conception of legal and political culture. 
Such an interpretation of the dignitarian model maintains the connection between 
due process and autonomy, but adopts a broader, more socially-embedded 
interpretation of autonomy as a concept associated with self-government. 
Autonomy relates essentially to a form of freedom of association on the part of 
individuals to organize themselves voluntarily into groups as a means through 
which to impress their private preferences on decision-makers. Within this 
framework, due process becomes a mechanism by which to assure ‘interest 
representation’ of individuals and groups within the broader community, with the 
aim of procedure being to involve in the process of decision-making all of the 
persons or groups affected by any decision-making action.30 The idea is that 
decision-making becomes more like a process of free negotiation or uninhibited 
bargaining among the various participants where the numbers and intensities of 
preferences will ultimately be reflected in decision-making outcomes.31 
 
                                                      
25 LAURENCE TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 666 (2d ed. 1988). 
26 Due process scholars have acknowledged the inadequacy of intuition as a normative foundation, and 
have eschewed the value of a natural rights jurisprudence ‘justly excoriated for its intuitive assertions of 
fundamental fairness’: MASHAW, DUE PROCESS IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE, supra note 7 at 47, 182.  
27 Edmund Pincoffs, Due Process, Fraternity and a Kantian Injunction, in PENNOCK AND CHAPMAN, supra note 
11. 
28 MASHAW, DUE PROCESS IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE, supra note 7 at 216. 
29 Id., 175–6, 185, 216–217. 
30 Stewart, supra note 7 at 1759. 
31 Cass R. Sunstein, Interest Groups in American Public Law 38 STAN. L. REV. 29, 32–3 (1985–1986). 
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1.3.3. The Public Interest Approach: A Model based on Public Accountability 
By contrast to the dignitarian model, which encourages a focus on self-interest, the 
public interest model regards procedural fairness as a mechanism through which 
to enhance representation of the public interest through decision-making. 
Proponents of this approach, including TRS Allan and Frank Michelman, view 
due process as a ‘guarantee of the opportunity for all to play their part in the 
political process.’32  It shifts the theoretical foundations away from individual 
autonomy, as defined in a Kantian or even a pluralist sense, and towards 
something more representative of social solidarity. From a theoretical perspective, 
it is underpinned by a ‘communitarian’ mentality, encouraging a wider sharing of 
legal authority based on the idea that popular consent and the development of 
shared beliefs can only arise from the public deliberation of the broad membership 
of the community. 
The public interest model encourages a ‘responsive’ approach to law and legal 
system as depicted by scholars such as Nonet and Selznick (drawing in turn upon 
the writings of Lon Fuller).33 Underpinning this model is the idea that no legal 
regime can endure without a foundation in consent. Responsive law borrows 
much from the experience of democracy, but considers that ‘gross legitimation’ 
through majority rule provides only crude accountability.34 Rather, the public 
interest model complements theories of deliberative democracy, emphasizing 
access to information and active participation in rational discourse as the 
foundation for political will formation and agreement.35 Due process serves as a 
process for communication and argument under which participants might be 
encouraged to phrase their objections as if they were thinking through which is 
best for all participants rather than encouraging self-interested claims. Increased 
opportunities for participation in decision-making strengthens the bonds of 
rational consent between individuals and decisions, feeding into discourse about 
the development of a shared body of values, with which decision-making should 
in turn accord. Under a public interest model of law, respect for decision-making 
authority is negotiated, not won by subordination to formal rules. The idea is that 
the decision- maker’s claim to authority and legitimacy is enhanced by an acknowl-
edgment that ‘the law or policy in question has been fairly adopted by procedures 
which enable all citizens to exert an influence, however limited, in any particular 
case’.36  
 
 
                                                      
32 T. R. S. Allan, Procedural Fairness and the Duty of Respect 18 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 497, 509 (1998); 
Michelman, supra note 20 at 136. 
33 PHILIPPE NONET AND PHILIP SELZNICK, LAW AND SOCIETY IN TRANSITION: TOWARD RESPONSIVE 
LAW (1978); LON FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW (Rev. ed., 1969). 
34 NONET AND SELZNICK, id., 56. 
35 See, for example, AMY GUTMANN AND DENNIS THOMPSON, DEMOCRACY AND DISAGREEMENT 
(1996); JÜRGEN HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS: CONTRIBUTION TO A DISCOURSE THEORY OF 
LAW AND DEMOCRACY (William Rehg trans. 1996).  
36 Allan, supra note 32 at 508 (emphasis added). 
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1.4. THE VALUE OF DUE PROCESS 
 
The slow pace of procedural reform in the UN context indicates that influential 
organs in the international order remain unconvinced of (or potentially 
uninterested in) the value of due process. Yet there is little point expecting policy-
based subsidiary organs of the Security Council such as sanctions committees or 
peacekeeping missions to adopt due process principles on blind faith. The step of 
unpacking the process values underlying due process law is an important one for 
academics to take in order to demonstrate the link between the legitimacy of such 
organs and due process, and to show the range of beneficial process values that 
can be promoted by due process. I have summarized the differences identified in 
the preceding discussion in Table 1 below. In the next sections, I examine how the 
three normative models of due process and the process values underlying them 
knit together with the emerging procedural frameworks in two contemporary 
contexts: the targeted sanctions regime and the Haiti cholera controversy.  
 
Table 1 
 Key Process 
Values 
Key Community 
Participants 
Theory of Law Values 
 
Instrumentalist 
 
Accuracy 
 
Lawmakers 
 
Positivist 
 
Value-Neutral 
 
Dignitarian 
 
Interest-
Representation 
 
Stakeholders 
 
Pluralist 
 
Pluralist 
Interests 
 
Public Interest 
 
Public Interest 
 
Broad Community 
 
Responsive 
 
Universal 
Values 
 
 
 
 
2. DUE PROCESS IN SECURITY COUNCIL SANCTIONS 
DECISION-MAKING 
 
In the late 1990s, concern about the devastating humanitarian impact of blanket 
sanctions against states led to a strategic shift in policy by the Security Council. 
Beginning with the sanctions regime against the UNITA rebel movement in 
Angola, the Security Council started targeting sanctions measures against relevant 
individuals, entities and products, rather than in blanket fashion against states. 
When it was proposed that the UN Office of Legal Counsel should be consulted 
about the policy shift to targeted sanctions, the reply from the Security Council 
was that there were ‘no legal issues’ involved in the listing or de-listing of 
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individuals on sanctions blacklists.37 The consequences of the Security Council’s 
assumption of decision-making authority over individuals were clearly under-
estimated. Paradoxically, a shift in policy engineered to inject greater fairness into 
the sanctions regime has given rise to nearly two decades of debate about the lack 
of due process in sanctions decision-making.  
As things stand, the ‘debate’ about due process in the sanctions context has 
become more in the nature of a conversation of the deaf. Seemingly intractably, 
the debate has become polarized around the need for a court. On the one hand, 
central to almost every reform proposal is the insistence on the inclusion of a 
judicial review mechanism in the sanctions decision-making process.38 On the 
other hand, the Security Council maintains its strong opposition to any form of 
judicial review of its decision-making.39 Instead, in 2009, the Security Council 
created the office of the UN Ombudsperson to engage in review of sanctions 
decision-making, though notably with a mandate that extends to only one of 
sixteen existing targeted sanctions regimes. This step has been deemed inadequate 
by (among others) the Court of Justice of the European Union, the European 
Court of Human Rights, the UK Supreme Court and the UN Special Rapporteur 
on Counter-terrorism and Human Rights, not because of its narrow scope of 
application to one sanctions regime, but on grounds the Ombudsperson is ‘not a 
court’.40 Problematically, with academics and critics almost exclusively focused on 
the need for a court-based process, the Security Council’s failure to extend the 
Ombudsperson’s mandate beyond the Al Qaeda sanctions regime has attracted 
limited comment, let alone opposition.41  
                                                      
37 Remarks by Hans Corell to 103rd Annual Meeting of the American Society of International Law, ‘Is the Security 
Council Bound by Human Rights Law’ (Mar. 27, 2009, Washington DC).  
38 See, for example, BARDO FASSBENDER, TARGETED SANCTIONS AND DUE PROCESS 31 (2006), para 
12.12; Larissa Van den Herik, The Security Council’s Targeted Sanctions Regimes: In Need of Better Protection of the 
Individual, 20 LEIDEN J. INT’L LAW 797, 806–807 (2007); International Commission of Jurists, Assessing 
Damage, Urging Action: Report of the Eminent Jurists Panel on Terrorism, Counter-Terrorism and 
Human Rights (2009), 116–17; Craig Forcese and Kent Roach, Limping into the Future: The UN 1267 
Terrorism Listing Process at the Crossroads 42 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 217, 265, 275 (2010); Jared Genser 
and Kate Barth, When Due Process Concerns Become Dangerous: The Security Council's 1267 Regime and the Need for 
Reform, 33 B. C. INT’L COMP. L. REV. 1, 37 (2010); Erika de Wet, Human Rights Considerations and the 
Enforcement of Targeted Sanctions in Europe: The Emergence of Core Standards of Judicial Protection, in SECURING 
HUMAN RIGHTS?: ACHIEVEMENTS AND CHALLENGES OF THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL 169 (Bardo 
Fassbender ed., 2011); GUGLIELMO VERDIRAME, THE UN AND HUMAN RIGHTS: WHO GUARDS THE 
GUARDIANS? (2011); Grant L Willis, Security Council Targeted Sanctions, Due Process and the 1267 Ombudsperson, 
42 GEO. J. OF INT’L LAW 673, 737, 743–745 (2011); Lisa Ginsborg and Martin Scheinin, You Can’t Always 
Get What You Want: The Kadi II Conundrum and the Security Council 1267 Terrorist Sanctions Regime, 8 ESSEX 
HUMAN RIGHTS REVIEW 7, 11–12, 19 (2011). 
39 Thirteenth Report of the 1267 Monitoring Team, UN doc S/2012/968, [15]–[16], [21] (Dec. 31, 2012); 
Security Council Report, Special Research Report: UN Sanctions, 14 (Nov. 25, 2013).   
40 European Commission & Council v Yassin Abdullah Kadi [2013] ECR not yet reported, [133]; Al-Dulimi and 
Montana v Switzerland (App No 5809/08), ECHR, 26 November 2013, [119]; Nada v. Switzerland [2012] 
ECHR 1691, paras 209–214; Her Majesty’s Treasury v Ahmed [2010] UKSC 2, [145]–[156] per Lord Phillips; 
[184]–[185] per Lord Rodger; [246] per Lord Mance; Ben Emmerson QC, Report of UN Special 
Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights while Countering Terrorism, UN doc 
A/67/396, [14], [20]–[21], (Sept. 26, 2012). 
41 Consider, for example, the repeated rejection of proposals by the Group of Likeminded States to 
extend the Ombudsperson’s mandate: UN doc S/PV.7285 (Oct. 23, 2014); UN doc S/PV.6964 (May 10, 
2013); UN doc S/2012/805 (Nov. 9, 2012). 
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In this Part, I undertake a value-based analysis, assessing the three procedural 
frameworks that have emerged in the sanctions context in terms of their capacity 
to fulfil the goals of their best-fit due process model. First, I examine the capacity 
of the primary option pushed by courts and commentators, the ‘internationalized 
judicial framework,’ to fulfil the goals of the instrumentalist model of due process. 
Secondly, I examine a framework that has emerged in a somewhat more organic 
fashion as an example of the dignitarian model, notably the ‘pluralist judicial 
framework’ under which domestic and regional courts are increasingly accepting 
challenges to sanctions decision-making under domestic or regional law. Third, I 
look at the Security Council’s nominated option, the UN Ombudsperson, and 
assess its capacity to fulfil the goals of the public interest model of due process. In 
doing so, I draw my own conclusions about which framework is best equipped to 
enhance legitimacy in the international domain, and resolve that it is not 
necessarily the court-based process favoured by most international lawyers. 
 
2.1. INSTRUMENTALIST MODEL: EVALUATING THE CASE FOR 
INTERNATIONAL JUDICIAL REVIEW 
 
We begin with discussion of the internationalized judicial or adjudicatory 
framework, the framework around which critics seeking reform in the Security 
Council sanctions setting have converged. The idea is that sanctions decision-
making should be subject to judicial review based on standards of international 
law. This is the model that a number of domestic and regional courts and tribunals 
have adopted, recasting themselves as ‘internationalized’ courts engaging in review 
of Security Council action under international law.42 
Recalling the focus of the instrumentalist model on greater accuracy, the 
model appears well positioned to contribute to the legitimacy of Security Council 
sanctions decision-making. The incidence of error has undoubtedly weakened the 
effectiveness and credibility of the sanctions regime. Yet it is as important to recall 
that the instrumentalist model and adjudicatory framework that supports it are 
equipped chiefly to deal with legal errors in a domestic governmental context. In its 
translation to the Security Council context, the model’s capacity to enhance 
legitimacy is disrupted by unique features of the Security Council setting. In 
particular, adoption of an instrumentalist model and associated internationalized 
court framework in the Security Council context would serve to: (a) entrench a 
narrow conception of community; (b) overplay the role of law in Security Council 
decision-making; and (c) have a stagnating effect on international values.  
 
                                                      
42 See, for example, Kadi v Council and Commission [2005] ECR II-0000 (‘CFI Kadi’); Her Majesty’s Treasury v 
Ahmed [2010] UKSC 2 per Lord Brown; UN Human Rights Committee, Sayadi and Vinck v Belgium 
(Communication No 1472/2006, 29 December 2008) UN Doc CCPR/C/94/D/1472/2006 (‘Sayadi’). I 
distinguish here courts that assess Security Council decision-making under domestic or regional law, 
discussed infra as examples of the dignitarian model in action. 
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2.1.1. Community: Power to the P5 (and their Platonic Guardians) 
In terms of community, a key problem with transplanting the instrumentalist 
model into the Security Council sanctions context is that it fails to broaden 
representation in sanctions decision-making beyond the scope of ‘law-makers’, and 
positions courts as guardians of the international legal order. While this might 
operate to enhance legitimacy in a domestic governmental context defined by 
strong command chains between administrative decision-makers, a representative 
legislature and an independent judiciary, in the Security Council context, the model 
becomes unhinged from the source of its legitimacy. 
The primary goal of the instrumentalist model is to advance the will of law-
makers. Yet, as discussed above, this is tied to the assumption that the law-makers 
embody the consent of the broader community. In the Security Council context, it 
is well appreciated that decision-making is carried out ‘without the benefit of 
lawmakers representative of the demos these rules purport to affect’.43 The main 
achievement of the model in the sanctions context will accordingly be to ensure 
the ‘accurate’ application of Security Council resolutions developed by the 15 
members of the Security Council, which — far from enhancing legitimacy — risks 
becoming highly authoritarian for the majority of international society. Rather than 
working to transform the traditional and increasingly outdated conception of 
international community, the predominant effect of an instrumentalist model 
would be to police the traditional gateway of the international community, 
legitimizing the dominance of the P5 and downplaying the significance of non-
state actors in international society. In the sanctions setting, the Security Council is 
becoming increasingly reliant on non-state actors for co-operation, 
implementation and enforcement of its decision-making. If these actors feel side-
lined or are otherwise dissatisfied with Security Council decision-making, they 
have shown a capacity to undermine the Council’s decisions by facilitating offers 
of employment, educational or travel opportunities, declining to freeze funds or 
actively contributing funds to those on sanctions blacklists.44  
In terms of review, those advocating reform have clearly seen an advantage in 
appointing courts as the central procedural actors in the Security Council context. 
Yet, as the brief history of the sanctions regime has shown, this has had 
undesirable effects, stringing courts between the poles of inert deference or over-
representative defiance. Those courts taking a deferential approach have 
emphasized the broad discretion granted to the Security Council under the UN 
Charter, determining that the combined operation of Articles 25 and 103 leaves 
the Security Council essentially free to take whichever measures it chooses in 
response to any threat to international peace and security.45 Other courts have 
                                                      
43 JOSE ALVAREZ, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AS LAW-MAKERS 630 (2005). 
44 See Per Cramér, Recent Swedish Experiences with Targeted UN Sanctions: The Erosion of Trust in the Security 
Council, in REVIEW OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL BY MEMBER STATES (Erika de Wet and André 
Nollkaemper eds., 2003); P Koring, Federal lawyers argue they have no obligation to bring Abdelrazik home, 
GLOBE AND MAIL (May 8, 2009). 
45 See, for example, the decision of the Administrative Appeals Board of the Turkish Council of State in 
Al-Qadi v The State (TK 2007) ILDC 311; UN Human Rights Committee, Sayadi, Individual opinion 
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shown deference by taking a narrow approach to the interpretation of applicable 
human rights principles, providing no protection for individuals and at the same 
time arguably distorting fundamental human rights principles.46 
The judgment of the Court of First Instance in 2005 Kadi exhibits both 
approaches. Here, the court identified a ‘rule of primacy’ of international law over 
municipal law, concluding that it had no power to review the lawfulness of 
Security Council resolutions under EU law.47 The court did, however, recognize a 
role ‘to check, indirectly, the lawfulness of the resolutions of the Security Council 
in question with regard to jus cogens’.48 The CFI took an unusually expansive 
reading of jus cogens, essentially putting all human rights within that category, 
including the right to a fair hearing, the right not to be arbitrarily deprived of 
property and the right to an effective remedy.49 The CFI then arguably took a 
second (mis)step, holding that there had been no breach of these norms in the 
case in question, despite the fact it had previously been widely accepted that the 
UN sanctions regime fell foul of these human rights standards. The court’s 
judgment has been roundly criticized for ultimately discarding the jus cogens 
qualification as a fig-leaf, interpreting this category as unusually broad yet 
seemingly impossible to violate.50 It is notable that the influence of the decision 
has been minimal, and the European Court of Justice subsequently overturned it, 
as discussed later.  
In contrast to the deferential approach, an instrumentalist model has led 
other courts to assume a far greater role in international-law-making than is 
normatively justifiable. Though the legal limits on the Security Council are narrow, 
they are also decidedly nebulous. While in the domestic setting, courts are 
accustomed to filling gaps left by the legislature, in the Security Council context, 
these gaps become chasms. Security Council resolutions are often vague, and are 
not drafted with the level of attention to detail that might be expected in the case 
of domestic legislation. Courts vested with the power of review would inevitably 
be required to make difficult and largely unguided substantive choices among 
competing values, and indeed among inevitably controverted political, social and 
moral conceptions of appropriate responses to threats to international peace and 
                                                                                                                                         
(partly dissenting) by Sir Nigel Rodley, Ivan Shearer and Iulia Antoanella Motoc, 27; Individual 
(dissenting) opinion of Ruth Wedgwood, 30; Individual opinion of Ivan Shearer, 32. 
46 See CFI Kadi, [268] and [288]; UN Human Rights Committee, Sayadi, [10.8]. 
47 CFI Kadi, paras. 218–225. 
48 CFI Kadi, paras. 226–231. 
49 CFI Kadi, paras. 226–229.  
50 CFI Kadi, paras. 226–230. For criticism of this decision, see Marko Milanovic, ‘Norm Conflict in 
International Law: Whither International Law?’ (2009) 20 Duke Journal of Comparative and International 
Law 69, 91 and 93; J. Klabbers, ‘Setting the Scene’ in J. Klabbers, A. Peters and G. Ulfstein, The 
Constitutionalization of International Law (Oxford: OUP, 2009) 1; C. Eckes, ‘Judicial Review of 
European Anti-Terrorism Measures — The Yusuf and Kadi Judgments of the Court of First Instance’ 
(2008) 14 European Law Journal 74; P. Eeckhout, ‘Community Terrorism Listings, Fundamental Rights 
and UN Security Council Resolutions: In Search of the Right Fit’ (2007) 3 European Constitutional Law 
Review 183, 195; E. Defeis, ‘Targeted sanctions, human rights, and the Court of First Instance of the 
European Community’ (2006) Fordham International Law Journal 1449, 1454. 
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security. For example, though the majority’s approach to the 1267 regime in the 
UK Supreme Court decision in Ahmed was predominantly dignitarian, their 
approach to Security Council resolution 1373 was more instrumentalist. In their 
interpretation of resolution 1373, the judgments exhibit the capacity for 
fragmentation in the interpretation — and in some cases the capacity for 
misinterpretation — of the Council’s intent. Lord Hope held that the ‘reasonable 
grounds for suspicion test’ adopted in the UK implementing mechanism went 
beyond the scope of the resolution, despite acknowledging evidence that this 
standard had overall support among states and was the standard applied by the 
Financial Action Task Force.51 Lord Mance expressed preference for a ‘balance of 
probabilities’ standard.52 Lord Phillips inserted a requirement into Security Council 
resolution 1373 that the asset-freeze regime applied only to “criminals,” though 
the sanctions regime is widely understood to be preventative rather than 
punitive.53 While the approach was more measured in the subsequent UK 
Supreme Court judgment in Youssef,54 the problem in Ahmed is that the judges did 
not seem to be sufficiently guided by the special requirements of the Security 
Council sanctions context. Courts should not take it upon themselves to create 
new aims for international society or to impose on society new basic directives.55 
Judicial activism by a court purporting to act as an unrepresentative and largely 
uninvited ‘guardian’ of the international legal order threatens to undermine rather 
than enhance the legitimacy and effectiveness of Security Council decision-
making. 
 
2.1.2. Law: The Ambiguity of Council Law  
A second set of problems stems from the nature and role of law in the Security 
Council setting. As discussed above, the instrumentalist model depends for its 
successful operation upon the existence of clear and determinate standards, rather 
than flexible guiding principles. As Professor Michelman notes (albeit in his 
critique of the instrumentalist model), ‘unless there are objective standards in 
terms of which decisions can be counted correct or incorrect, it is hard to see in 
what sense we can say that a decision serves to secure to an individual that which 
is rightfully his.’56 The instrumentalist model relies on a conception of law as a 
logically coherent and complete system of principles and rules, where consistency 
and predictability are the most important values, and where there is a concern to 
minimize the opportunity for arbitrary or unpredictable exercises of power.  
By contrast, the Security Council is a deliberately hegemonic institution in 
which consistency counts for little and power is always unpredictable. The scope 
                                                      
51 Her Majesty’s Treasury v Ahmed [2010] UKSC 2, para 57–61 (Lord Hope). 
52 Id., Lord Mance, 225–231. 
53 Id, paras. 136–37 (Lord Phillips), cf para 165, 170 (Lord Rodger). 
54 Youssef v Secretary of State [2016] UKSC 3, paras. 48–50 (Lord Carnwath, with whom Lord 
Neuberger, Lord Mance, Lord Wilson and Lord Sumption agree). 
55 JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1980); Fuller, supra note 12 at 392. See also Jones v Saudi 
Arabia [2006] UKHL 26, [63]. 
56 Michelman, supra note 20 at 130. 
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of legal norms binding the Council are limited, vague and, to an extent, undecided, 
embracing (according to the least controversial interpretation) narrow limitations 
in the UN Charter and those few norms that can be said to have attained the 
stratospheric status of jus cogens. Rather than being governed by law, the Security 
Council exercises a hybrid of political and legal authority.57 The leading 
commentary to the UN Charter contrasts the Security Council’s role to that of the 
ICJ on grounds that while ‘[t]he ICJ has to decide exclusively on the basis of 
international law… the S[ecurity] C[ouncil] has to decide primarily according to 
political criteria’.58  
The Security Council is a context in which discretion rather than rules is the 
gold standard. The consequence of this broad discretion is significant legal 
uncertainty. When asked to interpret whether the power granted to states under 
Security Council resolution 1730 to place a 90-day hold on a de-listing could be 
renewed indefinitely, the UN Office of Legal Affairs responded that a sanctions 
resolution means ‘whatever the sanctions committee wants it to’. The 
instrumentalist model is ill-equipped to operate in such a setting. Indeed, in due 
process theory, it is generally appreciated that, as decision-making moves away 
from rule-based decision-making and becomes more clearly discretionary, 
adjudicatory frameworks may need to give way to more broadly political 
consultative processes, focused on the representation of pluralist interests, or the 
realization of certain goals in the public interest.59 
 
2.1.3. Values: Stagnation of International Values 
The third potential problem with the instrumentalist model in the Security Council 
context is that the model lacks any substantive normative dimension. Its concern 
is to ensure the accurate fulfilment of the substantive law, while failing to provide 
a basis to differentiate between acceptable and unacceptable aspects of that law. 
The judgments of courts adopting an instrumentalist approach in the sanctions 
context reveal that review based solely on the process value of ‘legal accuracy’ is 
not sufficient to ensure the legitimacy of sanctions decision-making. In both 
Ahmed and Sayadi, those judges and Committee members that took an 
instrumentalist approach were forced to reserve their most damning indictments 
of the deficiencies in the Security Council sanctions regime for comments 
subsidiary to the main decision. 
Despite the fact that his legal analysis led him to confirm the validity of the 
sanctions regime in Ahmed, Lord Brown noted that ‘[t]he draconian nature of the 
                                                      
57 Rosalyn Higgins, The Place of International Law in the Settlement of Disputes by the Security Council, 64 AJIL 1 
(1970); Martti Koskenniemi, The Place of Law in Collective Security, 17 MICH. J. INT’L L 455 (1996). 
58 J Delbrock, Functions and Powers: Article 24, in THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS: A 
COMMENTARY (VOL I) 446 (Bruno Simma et al eds., 2002). 
59 Nicola Lacey, The Jurisprudence of Discretion: Escaping the Legal Paradigm, in THE USES OF DISCRETION 
(Keith Hawkins ed., 1992); D J GALLIGAN, DISCRETIONARY POWERS, 88, 343 (1986). 
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regime imposed under these asset-freezing orders can hardly be over-stated’60 and 
that the regime maintained by the latter Order in Council was ‘contrary to 
fundamental principles of human rights’.61 In Sayadi, Committee members who 
found the Security Council to be immune from review preceded this finding with 
the powerful statement that ‘by operation of the extravagant powers the Security 
Council has arrogated to itself, […] the executive branches of 15 member 
states…simply discard centuries of States’ constitutional traditions of providing 
bulwarks against exorbitant and oppressive executive action.’62  
These non-binding or subsidiary statements made in the broader context of 
decisions ultimately confirming the legal validity of an impugned regime reinforce 
the need to develop a procedural model that advances values apart from legal 
accuracy. The unintended effect of such a procedural framework may be freeze or 
crystallize international norms at a particular moment in time, failing to give 
sufficient credence to emerging perspectives on international legal norms and 
having a drag-effect on new developments.63 The interests of legitimacy of the 
Security Council, and the international legal order more generally, requires more of 
a procedural framework in contemporary international society.  
 
2.2. DIGNITARIAN MODEL: EVALUATING THE ROLE OF DOMESTIC AND 
REGIONAL COURTS 
 
Given the glacial pace of reform in the Security Council sanctions context, and 
continuing refusal by the Council to respond to calls for an ‘internationalized’ 
judicial de-listing procedure, an alternative de-centralized judicial framework has 
emerged more organically. Faced with increasingly urgent challenges by individuals 
to the UN sanctions regime, domestic courts have extended their traditional role 
as guarantors of individual rights beyond domestic governmental parameters to 
the Security Council sanctions context. In so doing, certain courts have eschewed 
a traditional international law analysis of the relationship between the Security 
Council and municipal legal systems, enforcing domestic or regional interpretations of 
individual rights even in the face of inconsistent with Security Council 
resolutions.64  
It is undoubtedly the case that this domestic and regional case law has been a 
most influential (and long overdue) source of individual rights protection in the 
sanctions context. The neglected voice of individuals placed on sanctions blacklists 
has been one of the major sources of criticism against the sanctions regime. The 
regime is not uncommonly compared to that of Josef K in Kafka’s The Trial, 
                                                      
60 Her Majesty’s Treasury v Ahmed [2010] UKSC 2, [192]. 
61 Id., [203]. 
62 Sayadi, Individual opinion (partly dissenting) by Sir Nigel Rodley, Ivan Shearer and Iulia Antoanella 
Motoc, 27. 
63 Anthea Roberts, Comparative International Law? The Role of National Courts in Creating and Enforcing 
International Law, 60 ICLQ 57, 73 (2011). 
64 See, for example, CFI Kadi; Kadi v European Commission [2010] EUECJ (General Court); Her Majesty’s 
Treasury v Ahmed [2010] UKSC 2; Nada v. Switzerland, [2012] ECHR 1691.  
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described as one that renders individuals ‘effectively prisoners of state’ that ‘does 
not begin to achieve fairness for the person who is listed’.65 Perceptions of the 
unfairness of the sanctions regime for individuals has been found by the Analytical 
Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team to have detracted from the credibility 
and effectiveness of the regime among member states.66 The influence of domestic 
and regional courts has served to vault the individual into a more central position 
in Security Council decision-making. 
However, expansion of this de-centralized adjudicatory framework has 
impact beyond more robust protection of individual rights. As other scholars have 
noted, the judicial review of Security Council decision-making in accordance with 
domestic and regional standards advances a pluralist vision of the international 
legal order.67 In line with this scholarship, I argue that this intervention by 
domestic courts, or ‘pluralist judicial framework’, can be analysed in theoretical 
terms as an example of the dignitarian model in action. Recognition of this 
connection between the pluralist judicial framework and dignitarian model enables 
us to undertake a normatively rich analysis of this framework and to draw a 
distinction between ‘moderate’ and ‘radical’ versions of the model. The aim is (a) 
to discourage an elitist conception of interest representation in the international 
community; (b) to encourage a ‘dialogue model’ of international law; and (c) to 
reinforce the need for domestic courts to aim for a balance between domestic and 
international values. 
 
2.2.1. Community: Trading International Community for a ‘Multiplicity of Publics’ 
Under a dignitarian model, the main aim of procedural safeguards is to provide 
individuals with a modicum of dignity, autonomy and self-respect, providing 
affected individuals with an opportunity to state their case and have that case 
taken into account in decision-making.68 That is not to say that individuals must in 
all cases directly represent their own interests before the decision-making body in 
question. The structure for interest representation under the dignitarian model is 
potentially more complex. As discussed above, the sturdiest theoretical 
foundations of the dignitarian model rest on a pluralist conception of autonomy, 
                                                      
65 Abdelrazik v Minister of Foreign Affairs 2009 FC 580, [53]; Her Majesty’s Treasury v Ahmed [2010] UKSC 2, 
[60] per Lord Hope (quoting Sedley LJ), cited with approval in Kadi v European Commission [2010] EUE CJ 
T-85/09, [149]; A, K, M, Q & G v HM Treasury [2008] EWHC 869 (Admin), [18]. 
66 See, for example, Thirteenth report of the 1267 Monitoring Team, UN doc S/2012/968, [17] (Dec. 31, 
2012); Ninth report of the 1267 Monitoring Team, UN doc S/2009/245, [16] (May 13, 2009). See also 
Security Council Report, Special Research Report: UN Sanctions, 14 (Nov. 25, 2013).  
67 This has been recognized by scholars such as NICO KRISCH, BEYOND CONSTITUTIONALISM: THE 
PLURALIST STRUCTURE OF POSTNATIONAL LAW (2010); Gráinne de Búrca, The European Court of Justice and 
the International Legal Order after Kadi 51 HARV. INT’L L. J. 1 (2010); Daniel Halberstam and Eric Stein, The 
United Nations, the European Union and the King of Sweden: Economic Sanctions and Individual Rights in a Plural 
World Order, 46 C. M. L. REV 13 (2009); Samantha Besson, European Legal Pluralism after Kadi, 5 EUR. 
CONST. L. REV. 237 (2009). 
68 Stewart, supra note 7 at 1684–1686, 1712; Pincoffs, supra note 27 at 179.  
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recognizing individuals as self-legislating equals who are able to choose freely 
where their interests might be represented.  
The use of domestic and regional courts under the dignitarian model is, in 
these terms, a manifestation of the right of individuals to choose freely the manner 
of their representation in the international domain. It builds upon a pluralist 
notion of public autonomy and the right of individuals to determine which polity 
they want to be governed in and by. The impact of the dignitarian model would 
not be to broaden the scope of the ‘international community’ as such. Under a 
dignitarian model, individuals caught up in sanctions decision-making are less 
likely to characterize themselves as members of an international community, and 
more as victims of it.  Individuals do not claim rights under the dignitarian model 
as members of the international community, but as individuals exercising their 
right to choose between a multiplicity of overlapping and conflicting identities and 
loyalties depending upon the situation or issue at hand.69 This is consistent with a 
pluralist conception of the international legal order, which rejects the idea of a 
singular constituency known as the ‘international community’ in favour of 
recognition of a ‘multiplicity of publics’.70  
 
2.2.2. Law: A ‘Dialogue Model’ of International Law71 
Critique of the role of domestic courts in review of sanctions decision-making is 
most commonly framed in ‘international rule of law’ terms. Critics invoke the 
danger that judicial review by domestic and regional courts will fragment sanctions 
compliance along the borders of national and supra-national jurisdictions, and lead 
to a breakdown in traditional notions of hierarchy codified in Articles 25 and 103 
of the Charter.72 The consequences for the Security Council sanction regime are 
not insignificant. The sanctions regime is uniquely vulnerable to failure by 
individual states to comply. Sanctions measures such as travel bans and asset-
freezing rely heavily on universal compliance, or else individuals and funds will be 
channelled into the breach. A steady stream of domestic case law along the lines of 
ECJ Kadi and the UK Supreme Court’s Ahmed could see the Security Council 
sanctions framework buckle under the weight of opposition by domestic and 
regional courts.73 
However, such criticism should also provoke us to question whether the 
transplant of ‘rule of law’ concepts to the international legal order is appropriate. 
                                                      
69 KRISCH, BEYOND CONSTITUTIONALISM, supra note 67 at 98. 
70 Nico Krisch, The Pluralism of Global Administrative Law, 17 EJIL 247 (2006); JOHN DRYZEK, 
DELIBERATIVE GLOBAL POLITICS: DISCOURSE AND DEMOCRACY IN A DIVIDED WORLD (2006); JAMES 
BOHMAN, DEMOCRACY ACROSS BORDERS (2007). 
71 On which, see further Devika Hovell, A Dialogue Model: The Role of the Domestic Judge in Security Council 
Decision-making 26 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 579 (2013). 
72 As the General Court recognized, the necessary consequence of the ECJ decision in Kadi has been ‘to 
render that primacy [of Security Council resolutions] ineffective in the Community legal order’: Kadi v 
European Commission [2010] EUECJ, [118].  
73 Twelfth Report of the 1267 Monitoring Team, UN doc S/2012/729, [33] (Oct. 1, 2012); Richard 
Barrett, Al-Qaeda and Taliban Sanctions Threatened, POLICY WATCH (Oct. 6, 2008), at 
http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/templateC05.php?CID=2935.   
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While hallowed rule of law characteristics such as certainty, consistency and 
generality of application may be appropriate in more representative legal systems, a 
pluralist perspective cautions against exaggerating the importance of such qualities, 
particularly in an unrepresentative system such as the international legal order. In 
the international sphere, certainty in the application of the law may be a source of 
friction and instability where it clashes with the strong preferences of excluded 
actors. The idea that all law must originate in a single power source, typically the 
domestic legislature, is a distinctly domestic idea. In the international legal system, 
state organs, international and domestic courts and (even) academics are imbued 
with a role in law creation.74  
In procedural terms, we may need to rethink the traditional conception of the 
judicial role where domestic and regional courts engage in review of international 
decision-making. Lon Fuller recognized the need for the judicial function to be 
constantly cognizant of the problem of system, in the sense that judges must always 
consider the coherence of the system in which they operate, and the powers and 
limitations of the institution of the judiciary as defined within that system.75 When 
courts engage in the review of international decision-making, they need to be 
cognizant of their role in the broader international legal system. In the 
international legal sphere, domestic and regional courts are repositioned within a 
more political forum, wherein they provide not a check or balance, but legal 
counsel. When domestic and regional courts engage in review of Security Council 
decision-making, judicial decisions are not so much relevant in terms of their 
‘bindingness’, but rather their level of persuasiveness, which will generally be tied 
to broader conceptions of an institution’s legal reasoning and reputation.76 Where 
a judicial decision resonates with a ‘broader movement for change,’ it will be 
influential in motivating reform; where it fails to resonate more broadly, it will be 
marginalized, seen as exceptional and have limited law-making effect.77 As courts 
and the Council develop a greater understanding of each other’s role, there is the 
potential for a legal culture to develop in which they come to see themselves as 
involved in a dialectical partnership or dialogue in which they are both working 
toward an appropriate balance between human rights and international security.78 
We saw something of this with the 2008 Kadi decision in the European Court 
                                                      
74 ICJ Statute, Article 38(1). 
75 LON FULLER, ANATOMY OF THE LAW 94 (1968).  
76 KRISCH, BEYOND CONSTITUTIONALISM, supra note 67 at 12; Benedict Kingsbury, Weighing Regulatory 
Rules and Decisions in National Courts, ACTA JURIDICA 90 [2009]; Mayo Moran, Shifting Boundaries: The 
Authority of International Law, in NEW PERSPECTIVES ON THE DIVIDE BETWEEN NATIONAL AND 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 163 (J. Nijman and A. Nollkaemper eds., 2007).  
77 ALAN BOYLE AND CHRISTINE CHINKIN, THE MAKING OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 301 (2007). 
78 For a depiction of the increasingly dialogic nature of the relationship between courts and legislatures in 
the domestic human rights context, see Tom Hickman, Constitutional Dialogue, Constitutional Theories and the 
Human Rights Act, PUBLIC LAW 303 (2005); Kent Roach, Dialogic Judicial Review and Its Critics, 23 SUPREME 
COURT LAW REVIEW (2D) 49 (2004); Janet L. Hiebert, Parliamentary Bills of Rights: An Alternative Model?, 69 
MOD. L. REV. 7 (2006). 
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of Justice.79 As is well known, the ECJ rejected the Court of First Instance’s 
deferential, instrumentalist approach and, in declining to defer to the Security 
Council, ultimately invalidated the regulation giving effect to the relevant Security 
Council resolution on the basis it violated fundamental rights of the European 
legal order. At the heart of the decision is the Court’s determination that the EC 
Treaty establishes an ‘autonomous legal system which is not to be prejudiced by an 
international agreement’.80 With a vague reference to the ‘alleged absolute primacy 
of the resolutions of the Security Council’,81 the ECJ declares it is not engaging in 
the review of the lawfulness of ‘a resolution adopted by an international body’, but 
rather of ‘the Community act intended to give effect to that resolution’.82 In 
drawing this separation between the EU implementing measure and its source in a 
Security Council resolution, the Court finds that ‘any judgment given by the 
Community judicature deciding that a Community measure intended to give effect 
to such a resolution is contrary to a higher rule of law in the Community legal 
order would not entail any challenge to the primacy of that resolution in 
international law’.83 The court concludes that the EU measure violates Mr Kadi’s 
rights of defence (including his right to be heard and right to effective judicial 
protection) and his right to respect for property, and holds that it must be 
annulled.84 
 Critics of the decision condemned it as taking the path of ‘European 
particularism’ and eschewing ‘engagement in the kind of international dialogue 
that has generally been presented as one of the EU”s strengths as a global actor.’85 
However, another interpretation is possible. Perhaps the judgment should be 
appreciated in its political context as more in the nature of an act of open judicial 
revolt against years of fruitless political dialogue. Türküler Isiksel invites us to see 
the ECJ’s judgment in Kadi as ‘an act of civil disobedience’ rendered necessary by 
the UN Security Council’s misapplication of foundational principles of the 
international order.86 She argues (and I agree) that the ECJ’s evasiveness towards 
international law in Kadi should not be regarded as lawless unilateralism, but as the 
fulfilment of its role to uphold the rule of law both within the EU and within the 
international legal order.87 Undoubtedly, the effect of the ‘disruptive’ ECJ Kadi 
decision was to strengthen the role and relevance of the ECJ,88 and also 
paradoxically to heighten the power and influence of the Security Council. 
The Security Council’s measured response to the decision, chiefly the 
introduction of the Office of the UN Ombudsperson, served to strengthen the 
                                                      
79 Kadi v Council and Commission [2008] ECR I–6351 (‘ECJ Kadi’). 
80 Id., para. 316. 
81 Id., para. 305 
82 Id., paras. 286–7 
83 Id., para. 288. 
84 Id. 
85 Halberstam and Stein, supra note 67 at 72; de Búrca, supra note 67. 
86 N. Türküler Isiksel, Fundamental Rights in the EU after Kadi and Al Barakaat 16(5) EUROPEAN LAW 
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intelligence and legitimacy of decisions made. Yet, from a normative perspective, I 
argue that the approach adopted in ECJ Kadi is best interpreted as an exceptionally 
interventionist approach.89 The ECJ’s failure to engage in any form of dialogue or 
negotiation of standards by reference to the broader decision-making context is 
justifiable only if this judgment is seen as an ‘act of civil disobedience’ responding 
to the fact that the gap between what was legal and what was legitimate had 
become too wide, as perceived by those bound by the UN sanctions regime. The 
problem is that, in Kadi II, to be discussed in the next section, the CJEU made the 
mistake of transforming the exception, a justifiable act of rebellion, into the rule.  
 
2.2.3. Values: Reconciling International, Regional and Domestic Values 
The dignitarian model of due process provides the opportunity for a more open 
and pluralistic dialogue between different values and interests at issue in decision-
making. The danger is that such a framework will ultimately lead to an 
overemphasis on powerful ‘interests’, paying little heed to the overarching need to 
contribute productive input into the development of a bedrock of shared 
fundamental ‘values’ that some regard as an essential complement to emerging 
structures of global governance.90  
Scholars such as Cass Sunstein and Jenny Steele have criticized pluralist 
approaches by invoking this contrast between ‘interests’ and ‘values.’91 The 
concern is that the Security Council will increasingly be cast in the role of a ‘broker 
of interests’ rather than a guardian of the purposes and principles of the UN 
Charter and international community. The situation is magnified in the Security 
Council setting on account of power and wealth differentials and language and 
culture barriers, which render meaningful communication and deliberation beyond 
a narrow elite very difficult.92 It is certainly the case that a geographical and socio-
economic bias is evident already in the impact of the emerging pluralist 
adjudicatory framework in the sanctions setting.93 Most judicial challenges to the 
sanctions regime have come from Europe and other advantaged nations, such as 
the United States and Canada. Smaller states agitating for reform in the sanctions 
context have declared it has been impossible even to get a conversation started on 
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the issue. By contrast, the decision in ECJ Kadi, facing the Council with the 
prospect of non-compliance by a region as influential as the European Union, 
yielded an immediate response with the establishment of the Office of the 
Ombudsperson. Arguably, the international legal order should not operate in 
accordance with principles of market-ordering so as to advance the interests and 
preferences of the most powerful and organized elites, but was created to ensure 
respect for certain fundamental values in international relations, which include 
substantive principles of equality and non-discrimination. 
In thinking through the translation of the dignitarian model of due process to 
the Security Council context, it is appropriate to compare and contrast two 
versions of the model that have emerged in the case law. In line with pluralist 
terminology, these could be termed ‘radical’ and ‘moderate’ approaches.94 Under 
the radical approach, domestic courts are almost entirely internally or domestically 
focused, and pay little regard to the overarching framework within which the 
decision under review was taken. Under a moderate approach, courts assign equal 
positions to different legal systems, though see the potential for their coordination 
having regard to a common point of reference or framework. 
In Kadi II (‘CJEU Kadi’), the Court of Justice of the European Union took a 
radical approach, transforming (what I have described above as) a justifiable act of 
rebellion in ECJ Kadi into an enduring normative approach. The CJEU held that, 
while Security Council resolutions had primacy at the international level, they 
became subject to the primacy of constitutional guarantees of the EU when 
implemented at the European level. The consequence is the application to Security 
Council decision-making of a peculiarly domestic interpretation of due process, 
developed in international treaties and across domestic legal systems to apply to 
the typical domestic governmental context, seemingly without reflection as to the 
appropriateness of its translation to the Security Council context.95 The ‘right to 
effective judicial protection’ is interpreted as a ‘declaration from a court, by means 
of a judgment ordering annulment whereby the contested measure is retroactively 
erased from the legal order’ and is found to have been violated in the sanctions 
context.96 
There is no attempt by the CJEU to evaluate the Ombudsperson procedure 
established as a review process in the Security Council sanctions context. The UN 
Ombudsperson is not even mentioned in the Court’s findings. Instead, the Court 
merely alludes to the ‘improvements added’ with a fairly abrupt conclusion that 
                                                      
94 This ‘pluralism of pluralisms’ draws on literature developed within the context of the EU as a means of 
theorizing the impact of the conflicting supremacy claims of the national and European levels in the EU, 
as adapted in NICO KRISCH, BEYOND CONSTITUTIONALISM, supra note 67. 
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‘they do not provide to the person… listed… the guarantee of judicial 
protection.’97  
Paradoxically, application of the right to ‘effective judicial protection’ in the 
Security Council sanctions context is inappropriate precisely because it proves 
ineffective in that context. In interpreting its power of review, the CJEU arrogates to 
itself a power to second-guess Security Council decision-making ‘to ensure that 
that decision, which affects that person individually…is taken on a sufficiently 
solid factual basis’.98 In doing so, it places the EU under an obligation to produce 
‘information or evidence… relevant to such an examination,’99 emphasizing that 
‘the secrecy or confidentiality of that information or evidence is no valid objection’ 
before the Courts of the EU. States, in particular members of the P5, will be 
extremely reluctant to give up information to a foreign court. Yet the CJEU 
acknowledges that, if it cannot get its hands on any information that supports the 
listing, it will be forced to annul the relevant sanctions measures.  
A more ‘moderate’ version of the dignitarian model was adopted by the 
Advocates-General in the Kadi litigation. Both Advocates-General based their 
decisions on European law, though with a keen eye on the need for coordination 
between the separate legal orders (European and international) in order to 
maintain coherence and integrity in the realm they share in common. The core of 
Advocate-General Maduro’s approach was to encourage a form of continuing 
dialogue between legal orders, stating that ‘[i]n an increasingly interdependent 
world, different legal orders will have to endeavour to accommodate each other’s 
jurisdictional claims,’100 Maduro proposed the application of an equivalence 
principle such as that applied in the famous Solange case,101 promising respect for 
the primacy of Security Council resolutions on the condition that fundamental 
rights benefited from an equivalent degree of protection at the international 
level.102  
Advocate General Bot, in turn, advocated a position of ‘mutual confidence 
and effective collaboration’, arguing that ‘an effective global fight against terrorism 
requires confidence and collaboration between the participating international, 
regional and national institutions, rather than mistrust.’103 Unlike the CJEU, he 
pays express attention to the improvements introduced following ECJ Kadi, in 
particular the establishment of the Office of the UN Ombudsperson. While 
emphasizing that the solution is not to give carte blanche to the Security Council, he 
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recognises that the Ombudsperson process ‘reflects a realization within the United 
Nations that, despite confidentiality requirements, the listing and delisting 
procedures must now be implemented on the basis of a sufficient level of 
information, that the communication of that information to the person concerned 
must be encouraged, and that the statement of reasons must be adequately 
substantiated.’104 He held that the Ombudsperson helped to guarantee that listings 
are based on sufficiently serious evidence and recognised that ‘excessively high 
regional or national requirements could, in truth, prove to be counterproductive’ if 
states were ‘less inclined in future to transmit confidential information to the 
Sanctions Committee’.105  
In considering the form of the dignitarian model, I argue that the moderate 
form is the preferable approach. The focus of courts should be on mechanisms by 
which to achieve the accommodation between conflicting values and interests in 
international society, and not on the triumph of one set of institutions or norms 
over another. Under a radical approach, the choice of frame, domestic, regional or 
international, determines the decision, where the danger is that each will seek to 
make its law govern the whole and to transform its preference into the general 
preference. Law and courts thereby become part of the problem, not of the 
solution. A more flexible moderate approach, seeking ‘equivalence’ of protection 
is arguably better equipped to motivate the Council to adopt a contextually 
appropriate set of rights that will strengthen the effectiveness of the Council as well 
as the protection of rights.106  
 
2.3. THE PUBLIC INTEREST MODEL: EVALUATING THE ROLE OF THE UN 
OMBUDSPERSON 
 
It remains to examine the procedural framework proposed by the Security Council 
itself in the sanctions context, the Office of the UN Ombudsperson. Yet rather 
than taking a dignitarian approach of assessing the ‘equivalence’ of the Office to 
regional or domestic procedural standards, the task is to examine the extent to 
which the Ombudsperson can be said to fulfil due process values under the public 
interest model. The primary appeal of the public interest model of due process is 
that it offers a capacity to redress one of the central critiques of the Security 
Council and the international legal order more generally: the idea that there is a 
‘democratic deficit’ in international governance. The Security Council sanctions 
regime invites a distilled version of the criticism made of the international legal 
order more generally that it increasingly represents ‘Governance without 
Government’,107 with the added sting that the Security Council has greater capacity 
than the rest of the international order to enforce its (undemocratic) diktats.  
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It is not that the Security Council was ever intended to behave as a 
democracy. The value of the public interest model lies in its potential to provide 
an alternative, and arguably more appropriate, analogue of an individual’s 
participation in a democratic political process. A number of scholars have argued 
for the adaptation of deliberative democracy theory to the Security Council 
context, identifying procedural safeguards as the key means through which to 
enhance the representativeness and therefore legitimacy of decision-making by 
international institutions.108 Ian Johnstone goes so far as to describe the 
representative deficit in the Security Council as ‘largely procedural in nature.’109 
In the following section, I argue that the Ombudsperson is a superior 
framework to internationalized or pluralist judicial frameworks in its capacity to 
achieve the goals of the public interest model. This goes against the grain of 
current opinion. While the Ombudsperson procedure has received strands of 
support in the reform debate, the assessment of the Office from a due process 
perspective has been mainly critical in the scholarly literature.110 The main 
concern, articulated by the CJEU, the European Court of Human Rights, the UK 
Supreme Court and the Special Rapporteur on the protection of fundamental 
rights while countering terrorism, among others, is that the Ombudsperson is ‘not 
a court.’111 Based on the value-based approach outlined in this article, I reach a 
different conclusion. My conclusion is that the Ombudsperson is in fact superior 
to a court process as it offers the most appropriate response to legitimacy gaps in 
Security Council sanctions decision-making. This is not to say that the 
Ombudsperson framework cannot be improved upon. However, far from 
dismissing the Ombudsperson framework as inadequate, those involved in the 
reform debate including practitioners, courts and scholars should encourage 
further strengthening the Ombudsperson’s mandate so as to promote the key 
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goals of the public interest model, and crucially its extension beyond the 1267 
sanctions regime to other sanctions regimes. 
 
2.3.1. Community: Access and Representation through the Ombudsperson Process 
The public interest model of due process does not reject the classical conception 
of the international legal order, but seeks to regenerate it, situating it within a 
broader and recognisably more heterogeneous framework of other legal orders 
and non-state entities. While the question of legal responsibility has traditionally 
been geared toward states, there is an understanding that accountability is now 
owed to a larger concept of stakeholders.112  
The Ombudsperson framework has undoubtedly opened up decision-making 
in important ways. The Ombudsperson is far more accessible than courts, and has 
the capacity to travel to the petitioner (rather than the reverse) for face-to-face 
interviews (or alternatively through email and telephone discussions) to ensure the 
petitioner’s side of the case is heard. This was emphasized in a recent case where 
the Ombudsperson had to rely on the ‘diligent and extraordinary efforts of 
officials’ in the UN and other states to gain access to the petitioner, resources that 
would not be available to domestic or regional courts.113  
The accessibility is enhanced by virtue of the fact the cost and delay of the 
Ombudsperson process is certainly less than that of judicial equivalents. While the 
absence of compulsory legal representation has been criticized,114 the 
Ombudsperson argues that the fact petitioners are not required to be represented 
by legal counsel in fact serves to make the process more accessible for 
petitioners.115 The Kadi case, already discussed in some detail, is clear evidence of 
its expeditiousness. Mr Kadi’s twelve-year march through the European courts 
entailing untold legal costs to reach the CJEU’s final ‘non-decision’ (in terms of its 
practical effect on Mr Kadi’s listing) stands in clear contrast to the nine-month 
Ombudsperson process that led to Mr Kadi’s de-listing and has been praised by 
Mr Kadi and his lawyers as a ‘proper hearing’, ‘formal and probing’, that made ‘an 
enormous difference to the person involved in the process’.116  
The public interest model does not merely seek to improve access for the 
petitioner, but also works to ensure decision-making is representative and inclusive 
of the international community more generally. As is normal for the Security 
Council, sanctions decision-making by and large take place behind closed doors, 
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without a public record being taken.117 This ‘culture of confidentiality’ was initially 
a prized technique, with the 1267 Sanctions Committee paying tribute to a 
Chairman who had ‘wisely determined that much of the work should be 
performed at informal meetings of the Committee to allow for enough flexibility 
in convening them and the free exchange of views, without a record’.118 However, 
the Committee’s lack of transparency has been the subject of trenchant criticism, 
to the extent it is now widely considered to have detracted from the effectiveness 
and legitimacy of the sanctions regime.  
The establishment of the UN Ombudsperson has done more to open up 
sanctions decision-making than any previous reform. The Ombudsperson’s role is 
structured to focus on information-gathering, consultation and outreach, and not 
just with the petitioner. In addition to a four-month period of information 
gathering (extendable for a further two months if necessary), and a two-month 
period of engagement, which may include a dialogue with the petitioner, to gain 
any additional information that may help the Committee with their decision, the 
Ombudsperson engages in significant outreach in the course of her work. She 
meets regularly with states, intergovernmental organizations, UN bodies, judges of 
national, regional and international courts, prosecutors, private lawyers, academics, 
representatives of non-governmental organizations and civil society.119 In opening 
up decision-making in this way, the Ombudsperson process makes important 
political space, recognizing the role of NGOs, individuals, corporations and other 
levels of state governments beyond the executive.120 More than court-based 
processes, the Ombudsperson process has the potential to function as both a 
forum and audience for democratization by increasing access to information and 
opening up deliberation to a wider cross-section of the international community. 
 
2.4. LAW: A CONTEXTUAL AND RESPONSIVE SET OF LEGAL STANDARDS 
 
The Ombudsperson framework is not a one-way street in terms of outreach with 
the broader international community. By opening up the information flow 
between decision-making and the broader community, the aim is not solely to 
enhance public awareness about the sanctions regime, but also to increase the 
Council’s responsiveness to public concerns about decision-making, and the 
values that should underlie it. Here, the non-judicial nature of the Office is an 
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advantage. The central aim of inviting and responding to public opinion does not 
sit comfortably with the judicial function. As Richard Stewart noted in his 
enduring critique of a judicially-implemented system of interest representation, 
judicial review was traditionally an instrument for checking governmental power 
and does not touch on the ‘affirmative side’ of government, which has to do with 
the representation of individuals and interests.121  
In terms of applicable legal principles, the Ombudsperson is not confined in 
the same way as courts to review of the initial decision, ‘frozen in time’ as it were, 
restricted to the limited toolkit of binding international law (described under the 
instrumentalist model) or the divaricating toolkit of binding domestic or regional 
law (described under the dignitarian model). Instead, she is able to engage in de 
novo review to consider ‘whether today the continued listing of the individual or 
entity is justified based on all of the information now available.’122 Rather than 
being hamstrung by existing law, either domestic or international, the 
Ombudsperson has been able to develop a standard of review that responds both 
to the specific aims of sanctions measures (hampering access to resources and 
encouraging a change of conduct) and the international framework within which 
sanctions apply. In these circumstances, she has concluded it is inappropriate to 
use criminal standards though necessary to set a sufficient level of protection to 
take account of the seriousness of the measures for the individual affected. She 
was also conscious that the benchmark used could not be premised on the 
precepts of one particular legal system. The standard settled on is a unique one: 
‘whether there is sufficient information to provide a reasonable and credible basis 
for the listing.’123 
The criticism of the ‘non-judicial’ nature of the Ombudsperson framework is 
not so much tied to the legal standards she applies, but is essentially shorthand for 
two critiques: first, the lack of bindingness of the Ombudsperson’s report and, 
secondly, the lack of independence from the Security Council (tied to the capacity 
for the Security Council to overturn her report). The criticism is exaggerated. 
Security Council resolution 1989 strengthens the Ombudsperson procedure by 
building in a ‘reverse consensus,’ such that the Ombudsperson’s recommendation 
to de-list will bind the sanctions committee unless, within 60 days, every single 
member of the sanctions committee decides not to follow it.124 Much has been 
made of the fire-alarm possibility under which any Committee member can refer 
the matter to the Security Council for decision. However, the eventuality has not 
occurred over the first five-year operation of the Office and the Monitoring Team 
has expressed the view that it is ‘extremely unlikely’ that the Committee would 
reject the Ombudsperson’s recommendation or refer it to the Security Council 
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unless it was already evident that at least nine members of the Council agreed the 
decision of the Ombudsperson was wrong and that no permanent member 
thought it was right.125 Moreover, the possibility of Security Council intervention 
does not distinguish the Ombudsperson framework from other judicial contexts in 
the international legal system, including the International Court of Justice and the 
International Criminal Court.126 
It is not the exception but the norm to build ‘fire-alarm’ controls into 
instruments establishing international courts, which can be triggered if judges are 
perceived by states to exceed the bounds of their delegated authority. The 
literature on international adjudication abounds with scholarly recognition of the 
limits of judicial independence in the global context, with Helfer and Slaughter 
referring to ‘constrained independence,’127 Ginsburg referring to ‘bounded 
discretion’128 and Steinberg referring to the ‘strategic space’ within which courts 
can operate.129 
All this aside, it is not so much the bindingness of the decision that is most 
relevant. The power of the Ombudsperson stems, not from the bindingness of her 
decisions, but from their capacity to exact reputational costs. The Council is 
invited to enhance the legitimacy and effectiveness of its decision-making through 
an appeal, not to power politics, but to public reason. These reasons are in turn 
assessable by the ‘court of public opinion’. As Johnstone elaborates in the Security 
Council context, ‘[i]f the interpretive community of governmental and non-
governmental actors casts a negative judgment, the credibility of the Security 
Council will be undermined and those who must carry out the decisions will be 
less likely to comply.’130 
As such, even if the Security Council did overturn the Ombudsperson’s 
decision, the Council risks undermining the effectiveness of the sanctions regime 
where it has been deemed that there is no public justification for its decisions and 
it has withheld other information critical to the evaluation of institutional 
performance.131 In this light, the key focus of reform to the Ombudsperson 
process should not be upon the bindingness or independence of the Office, but 
rather on greater transparency. As things stand, the Ombudsperson’s 
comprehensive report is not made available to interested States, the petitioner or 
the public. A critical reform is to provide for public disclosure of reports with 
                                                      
125 Thirteenth Report of the 1267 Monitoring Team, UN doc S/2012/968, [12] (Dec. 31, 2012). 
126 UN Charter, Art. 94(2) (note in particular interpretation in Medellin v Texas, 552 US 491 (2008)); Rome 
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130 Id., 307. 
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proper measures in place to ensure the protection of confidential material. The 
goals of the public interest model of due process will be most adequately served 
where the international community is placed in a position to understand and assess 
the reasons for the sanctions committee’s (and the Ombudsperson’s) decisions. 
 
2.4.1. Values: Balancing Fundamental Values of Security Council and Individuals 
In terms of a clash of values, the knife-edge along which some of the most 
problematic and intransigent divisions in the due process debate have arisen is the 
conflict between individual due process rights and the confidentiality of 
intelligence information upon which sanctions decisions are based. On the one 
hand, the Security Council cites confidentiality concerns as the key reason to limit 
due process protections on the basis that it is too complicated to ‘[find] a way to 
keep such intelligence, and how it was gathered, confidential.’132 On the other 
hand, as discussed above in CJEU Kadi, the Court claimed the power to engage in 
full review of sanctions decision-making, while insisting that ‘the secrecy or 
confidentiality of that information is no valid objection before the courts of the 
EU.’133  
This deadlock is clearly unsatisfactory. The solution should neither be to 
abandon procedural protections altogether, nor to impose unrealistic obligations 
upon the Council to release information to domestic or regional agencies where 
that obligation is highly unlikely to be complied with. While it is well understood 
that transparency is a desirable institutional value and a core attribute of good 
governance, secrecy and non-disclosure can also have value in particular 
contexts.134 At the same time, it is widely considered that the extent to which 
information about sanctions decision-making has been shielded has been 
disproportionate. The challenge is to devise imaginative institutional measures that 
can achieve the most appropriate balance between the individual rights of those 
placed on sanctions blacklists, and the interests of international peace and security.  
I argue that the Ombudsperson framework offers the greatest potential for 
reconciliation of due process and confidentiality concerns. The Ombudsperson 
has described gaining access to classified or confidential information as ‘one of the 
key challenges’ she faces.135 The Ombudsperson has expressed her confidence that 
in all cases (with one exception)136 that the petitioner has been provided access to 
the reasons for their listing.137 However, she is also aware that ‘this question of 
                                                      
132 Press Conference by Security Council President Ambassador Gérard Araud, (Feb. 2, 2010),   
http://www.un.org/News/briefings/docs/2010/100202_Araud.doc.htm.  
133 CJEU Kadi, [125]. 
134 Elizabeth Fisher, Transparency and Administrative Law: A Critical Evaluation, 63 CURR. LEGAL PROBS. 272, 
280 (2010); ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER 220 (2004). 
135 Second Report of the Office of the Ombudsperson’ UN doc S/2011/447, [26] (Jul. 22, 2011). 
136 In the exceptional case, the Ombudsperson acknowledges that the petitioner was prejudiced as the 
relevant information was obtained at such a late stage that it could not be disclosed to the petitioner 
before preparation of the comprehensive report and has invited comments from the petitioner with a 
view to deciding whether he meets the threshold for a new petition: Sixth Report of the Office of the 
Ombudsperson, UN doc S/2013/452, [33]–[35] (Jul. 31, 2013). 
137 Eighth Report of the Office of the Ombudsperson, UN doc S/2014/73, [34] (Jul. 31, 2014). 
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access is a critical one for due process,’138 and — in tangent with the Security 
Council — she has negotiated a set of procedures enhancing her capacity to access 
critical information. The advantages of the Ombudsperson framework over other 
institutional frameworks are threefold:  
 
Expertise: The Ombudsperson deals more in ‘intelligence’ than ‘evidence’. With 
the support of the Monitoring Team, which is able to provide expert advice 
including analysis of audio-visual material, the Ombudsperson is in a far better 
position than courts to assess this credibility of information. The 
Ombudsperson has acknowledged the importance of experience and 
‘institutional memory’ developed across the complex matrix of sanctions cases 
in enabling her to assess the key questions and issues of concern for the 
Sanctions Committee.139 In particular, the Ombudsperson has emphasized the 
value of her personal access to petitioners in the dialogue phase of the 
process, during which she has the opportunity to ask petitioners to respond to 
and explain inferences that might be drawn from relevant intelligence while 
working classified material into the background.140  
 
Access to Pressure Points: While the Ombudsperson has no power to compel 
production of confidential information, she is in a unique position to place 
pressure on states to provide such information. First, the Ombudsperson’s 
request for information is mandated by a Chapter VII Security Council 
resolution, which she has confirmed has proved useful in encouraging states 
to co-operate with the Ombudsperson.141 Secondly, as the Ombudsperson has 
recognized in a recent report, ‘any lack of detail does not work to the prejudice 
of the petitioner’ as refusal by a state to provide information risks leading to a 
de-listing recommendation on the grounds of insufficient evidence.142 As 
discussed above, the Ombudsperson’s decision has a ‘triggering effect’, and 
can only be reversed if the sanctions committee decides by consensus to do 
so.143 Third, the Ombudsperson is directed to update the 1267 Committee as 
individual cases progress, specifying ‘details regarding which States have 
supplied information.’144 Fourth, the Ombudsperson reports biannually 
directly to the Security Council, and in these reports typically discusses the 
level of state co-operation. Through such reports, both the Council and the 
                                                      
138 First Report of the Office of the Ombudsperson, UN Doc S/2011/29, [33] (Jan. 24, 2011). 
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142 Third Report of the UN Ombudsperson, id., at [42]. 
143 UN Security Council resolution 1989, UN Doc S/RES/1989, [23] (Jun. 17, 2011). 
144 Security Council resolution 1904, UN doc S/RES/1904, Annex II, [4] (Dec. 17, 2009).  
 
 
Devika Hovell                                       Due Process in the United Nations  
 
 33 
broader international community are made aware of failures in state co-
operation, increasing pressure on states to comply. 
 
Negotiation of Specific Arrangements: An additional innovation of the UN 
Ombudsperson is the practice of entering into specific arrangements with 
individual states to obtain access to confidential information. The 
Ombudsperson is in a unique position to build up a level of trust with states, 
which at least theoretically should not be difficult to achieve given the 
Ombudsperson is appointed by the Secretary-General in consultation with the 
sanctions committee and must be ‘an eminent individual of high moral 
character, impartiality and integrity with high qualifications and experience in 
relevant fields.’145  
 
2.5. CONCLUSION 
 
Applying a value-based approach to the Security Council sanctions context, my 
conclusions are surprising. The internationalized judicial framework, measuring 
sanctions decision-making in terms of its accuracy in the application of binding 
law, emerges as the model least likely to enhance legitimacy in decision-making. By 
contrast, I conclude that the UN Ombudsperson offers the greatest potential to 
enhance the representativeness and responsiveness of Security Council sanctions 
regime. The non-judicial nature of the Office potentially serves as an advantage 
offering valuable techniques through which to hold the Security Council to 
account, while accommodating the Security Council context of broad discretion, 
political compromise and necessary confidentiality. Domestic courts exercising a 
moderate form of dignitarianism can also play an important role, though their 
most effective contribution would be less as agents of enforcement of 
international, regional or domestic law, and more through lending expert 
contribution to a broader dialogue. To test the value-based approach further, we 
turn next to the other major site of due process controversy in the UN context: 
the ongoing remedial failure relating to claims that UN peacekeepers negligently 
introduced cholera into Haiti. 
 
 
 
3. DUE PROCESS IN A TIME OF CHOLERA 
 
In October 2010, cholera appeared in Haiti for the first time in nearly a century. 
Shortly before the outbreak, a new contingent of Nepalese peacekeepers had been 
deployed to the Mirebelais camp of the UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti 
(MINUSTAH), located above a tributary of the Arbonite River, one of Haiti’s 
main sources of drinking water. There is a credible argument from an 
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epidemiological and microbiological perspective that the cholera bacteria was 
introduced into the Arbonite River due to inadequate sanitation conditions at the 
Mirebelais camp.146 The contamination triggered an epidemic that has caused the 
death of almost 9,000 people, close to twice the Ebola death toll in any one 
country, and the illness of over 700,000 more.147 The Independent Panel of 
Experts appointed by the UN Secretary-General found that the evidence 
‘overwhelmingly supports’ the conclusion that the 2010 Haiti cholera outbreak 
was caused by the contamination of the Meye Tributary System of the Artibonite 
River as ‘a result of human activity’ by bacteria that was a ‘perfect match’ with the 
Nepal cholera strain at the relevant time.148 The Panel also found that sanitation 
conditions at the MINUSTAH camp were not sufficient to prevent contamination 
of the Meye Tributary System with human faecal waste.149 Two years after the 
release of the initial report, the members of the Panel updated their findings and 
stated more directly that ‘the preponderance of the evidence and the weight of the 
circumstantial evidence does lead to the conclusion that personnel associated with 
the Mirebalais MINUSTAH facility were the most likely source of introduction of 
cholera into Haiti.’150  
The initial source of the cholera outbreak is no longer reasonably in question. 
What remains controversial is the question of UN accountability for its role in the 
cholera outbreak. While, not so long ago, such a crisis might have entered 
collective memory as an ‘Act of God’ or a regrettable historical episode defying 
explanation, responsibility or redress, ‘accountability management’ is part of any 
crisis post-mortem in today’s risk society.151 Societies affected by large-scale crisis 
typically demand some organization or entity to be held responsible and lessons to 
be drawn as part of an essential process in order to achieve a stable post-crisis 
equilibrium.152 There is a widespread sense that the UN response has denied 
Haitian society this opportunity. In the month following the cholera outbreak, the 
UN spokesperson for MINUSTAH rejected any ‘objective direct link… between 
the soldiers and the outbreak.’153 In response to the report of the Independent 
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Panel, the UN declared that the report ‘does not present any conclusive scientific 
evidence linking the outbreak to the MINUSTAH peacekeepers or the Mirebalais 
camp’ and that ‘[a]nyone carrying the relevant strain of the disease in the area 
could have introduced the bacteria into the river.’154 The Secretary-General 
appointed a Task Force to ‘ensure prompt and appropriate follow-up’ to the 
Panel’s Report, however the first follow-up material did not appear until mid-2014 
and then did not mention the question of UN accountability for its role in the 
cholera outbreak.  
In the meantime, NGOs have pursued UN accountability for its role in the 
crisis. In November 2011, the Boston-based Institute for Justice and Democracy 
in Haiti (IJDH) working with lawyers in Haiti presented a petition to the UN 
Secretary-General on behalf of 5,000 individuals.155 It took fifteen months for the 
UN to respond to the petitioners’ legal arguments, which were dismissed in two 
sentences of a two-page letter on the basis the claims were ‘not receivable’ 
pursuant to section 29 of the General Convention on the Privileges and 
Immunities of the United Nations.156 In a follow-up letter to a request by the 
petitioners for the UN to establish a standing claims commission, engage a 
mediator or even arrange a meeting to discuss the matter, the UN responded that 
‘there is no basis for such engagement in connection with claims that are not 
receivable.’157 Since October 2013, three separate class action suits have been filed 
in the Southern District of New York against the UN.  
The UN’s handling of these credible allegations of malfeasance has been 
described as a ‘public relations as well as public health disaster.’158 The pervading 
sense is one of an organization stonewalling any inquiry into its accountability.159 
Yet it is also arguable that the quest for accountability has been too narrowly 
focused. The debate about due process has been confined to its separate legal silos 
of immunity and human rights, with little authoritative capacity to reconcile the 
two areas of law, though some authors have expressed the desire to move beyond 
them.160 I argue that a value-based approach to due process offers a way to 
reconcile these conflicting yet fundamental legal spheres. Instead of focusing on 
the question of which area of law is more ‘binding’ or ‘supreme’, the overarching 
question is: what role do we require due process to play in this setting and which 
procedural framework is best equipped to achieve it?  
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3.1. INSTRUMENTALIST MODEL: EVALUATING THE QUEST FOR LEGAL 
RESPONSIBILITY 
 
As in the Security Council sanctions context, the debate about procedural 
protections applicable in the Haiti cholera controversy has taken a decidedly 
instrumentalist turn. In essence, the question of due process has been reduced to a 
fiercely debated contest over the most accurate interpretation of legal principles 
relating to UN immunity. Repeated assertions by UN officials that claims are ‘not 
receivable’ have been greeted in turn by a storm of critical scholarship, devoted to 
assessing whether the UN has accurately characterized its obligations under the 
General Convention. I argue that this ‘instrumentalist bias’ in the debate about due 
process is misplaced and unproductive. As I will argue below, the instrumentalist 
approach to the formulation of procedural safeguards will lead to a narrow debate, 
the result of which will be decided (a) by a state-centric echo chamber; (b) in 
accordance with under-developed legal standards; and (c) to comport with a 
‘functionalist’ value system that many agree is out of date. 
 
3.1.1. Community: Keeping it in the (UN) Family 
Paradoxically, cholera was one of the early issues to unite the international 
community through the international sanitary conferences convened in the second 
half of the nineteenth century.161 As might be expected, these early conferences 
were hardly paragons of internationalism. Though the disease caused its highest 
mortality rates in other regions, delegates were essentially united in defending 
Europe against ‘the Oriental plague’. Over 150 years later, there is a sense that the 
structures of internationalism are still not tuned into the voice of those 
populations most vulnerable to cholera outbreaks.  
Individuals or groups of individuals harmed by UN action have few options, 
still less where they are nationals of a vulnerable state such as Haiti dependent on 
UN assistance. The law relating to the responsibility of international organizations 
does not, in its current incarnation, have much to say at all about an organization’s 
relationship with non-state actors. The ILC Articles on the Responsibility of 
International Organizations, concluded in 2011, expressly do not contemplate an 
accountability regime beyond responsibility to states in their individual or 
collective form.162  
The UN response to victims of the Haiti cholera outbreak reflects that the 
narrowness of the legal regime for responsibility has also become culturally 
ingrained. The richest dialogue about the scope of UN accountability for the Haiti 
cholera outbreak was not with affected individuals or their legal representatives, 
but with other UN officials. On 25 September 2014, four UN-mandate-holders 
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addressed a joint letter of allegation to the UN Secretary-General. In contrast to 
the two sentences denying UN liability in the response to the victims’ petition 
discussed in the introduction to this section, the response to the UN Special 
Rapporteurs spent fifteen pages outlining the scope of UN accountability. Even 
here, the UN described its ‘formal organizational accountability’ as extending to 
‘the General Assembly, the Security Council or other relevant intergovernmental 
bodies’, attributing only secondary relevance to individuals, civil society or other 
relevant actors (whose primary significance was described in terms of assisting 
with fact-finding inquiries).163 
The ‘natural forum’ through which individuals have traditionally vindicated 
their rights, namely domestic courts, is essentially foreclosed in the UN context. 
At the heart of the regime for UN responsibility is recognition of broad, even 
absolute, immunity from ‘every form of legal process.’164 According to a 
traditional immunity analysis, it is still widely accepted that, whatever immunities 
other international organizations possess, the combined effect of Article 105 of 
the UN Charter and section 2 of the General Convention ‘unequivocally grants 
the UN absolute immunity without exception.’165 The General Convention and 
relevant Status of Forces Agreement between the UN and Haiti (‘UN-Haiti 
SOFA’) provides for the establishment of a standing claims commission as an 
alternative mode of dispute settlement, however these agreements can only be 
enforced by Haiti. Theoretically, under the General Convention, Haiti could 
request an advisory opinion from the ICJ requesting establishment of a standing 
claims commission.166 However, in practice, this is unlikely. The Haitian 
government, under the Martelly administration, has not been supportive of justice 
for victims, concerned instead to portray Haiti as ‘open for business’ while 
remaining heavily dependent on UN assistance and foreign aid.167 
 
3.1.2. Law: The Power and the Emptiness of Immunity Law  
The international regime for the responsibility of international organizations is not 
only state-centric, but also steers the question of UN accountability down the path 
of a positivistic legal analysis. According to the ILC Articles, the responsibility of 
international organizations is to be determined by reference to international law.168 
This accounts for a highly legalistic debate in which the question of due process 
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has been caught in the cross-fire of an ongoing turf war between immunity law 
and its chief pretender human rights law. The UN’s ‘traditional immunity analysis’, 
described in the previous section, has been challenged by two main streams of 
legal argument, which I will describe as (i) a human rights analysis and (ii) a 
functional necessity analysis. The problem in instrumentalist terms is that, while 
these counter-arguments are persuasive in urging the need for law reform, they do 
not represent an accurate reflection of existing law. Instead, their primary effect is 
to emphasize the relative normative emptiness of extant law and the stronghold 
that international organizations and states continue to have over it. 
 
3.1.2.1. Human Rights Analysis 
Certain scholars have argued that it is time for a ‘major evolution’ in the regime 
for immunity of international organizations.169 A ‘human rights’ approach to 
immunity has developed in legal scholarship,170 with hints in the jurisprudence of 
the European Court of Human Rights.171 The argument finds its strongest legal 
foundation in section 29 of the General Convention, in which the UN undertakes 
to ‘make provisions for appropriate modes of settlement of… [d]isputes of a 
private law character to which the United Nations is a party’.172 A number of 
scholars have argued that fulfilment of the section 29 undertaking is a ‘condition 
precedent’ to UN immunity such that, where the UN fails to provide an alternative 
remedy, immunity should be denied.173  
It is by virtue of this instrumentalist ‘human rights’ approach that Frédéric 
Mégret has determined that the ‘pivotal question’ in the Haiti cholera dispute is 
‘the characterization of the claim as “private” or “public”.’174 The obligation to 
provide alternative modes of settlement applies only to disputes of a ‘private law 
character,’ begetting the inquiry as to which side of the public/private line the 
claims of Haiti cholera claims fall. The UN asserts that the claims raise ‘broad 
issues of policy’ and ‘could not form the basis of a claim of a private law 
character.’175 The problem is that any court asked to make an objective 
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determination of the question risks engaging in a theatre of the absurd. Duncan 
Kennedy argues that the success of any legal distinction depends on two facets: 
first, whether it is possible to make the distinction; and secondly, whether the 
distinction makes a difference.176 Arguably the public/private distinction fails on 
both counts in the UN context. The dichotomy’s foundations are unstable and 
insufficiently understood, even in the civil and continental system in which it finds 
its geographical and historical foundations.177 In the UN context, there is 
considerable uncertainty as to whether the distinction refers to the body of law,178 
the nature of the complainant,179 the nature of the conduct180 or the nature of the 
forum.181 The UN’s public statements on the characterization are difficult to 
reconcile and much of its reasoning in relation to particular claims is buried in the 
inaccessible ‘internal jurisprudence of the UN.’182 It is difficult to avoid the 
conclusion that the UN’s depiction of the Haiti cholera dispute is little more than 
a formalist brush-off that lacks meaning.  
For the time being at least, the question is moot. The human rights analysis is 
yet to succeed before domestic courts.183 To the extent there has been some 
‘nibbling away’ at the edges of immunity outside the UN context in cases such as 
Waite and Kennedy, this is far from a finding that the international community of 
states has swallowed the argument.184 As recognized above, it is still widely 
accepted that the UN enjoys broad if not absolute immunity before domestic 
courts, even where the UN fails to provide an alternative remedy. 
 
3.1.2.2. Functional Necessity Analysis 
Another version of the restrictive immunity argument looks to the normative 
foundation for granting immunity to international organizations. According to this 
analysis, immunity is functional and thus restricted such that the UN should ‘be 
entitled to (no more than) what is strictly necessary for the exercise of its functions 
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in the fulfilment of its purposes’.185 This argument is said to be strengthened by 
Article 105 of the UN Charter (read in conjunction with Article 103), which grants 
immunity in terms narrower than those in the General Convention, referring to 
immunities ‘necessary for the fulfilment of [UN] purposes’. However, this narrow 
reading is inconsistent with the stated intention of the drafters of the UN 
Charter.186 Moreover, no court to date has been willing to deny UN immunity on 
the basis immunity is not functionally necessary. There seems to be fairly universal 
consensus that the question is, in any event, not one that should be left to 
domestic courts. As most scholars toying with the argument conclude, the proper 
forum for determining an organization’s ‘proper’ purposes or functions is within 
the organization’s political organs.187  
 
3.1.2.3. Conclusion 
Legally, the UN is on fairly solid legal ground in claiming immunity. There is room 
to argue that pressure should be placed upon the UN to establish a standing 
claims commission, however, this does not seem to be the main focus of much of 
the reform literature. Instead, well-intentioned legal scholars keen to push the law 
forward have engaged in normative overshoot by claiming that a restrictive 
‘human-rights-based’ or ‘functional’ interpretation of UN immunity would justify 
domestic courts declining to recognize UN immunity in the present case. The 
problem is that the instrumentalist approach to due process ultimately leads to 
something of a legal cul-de-sac. While counter-arguments to the traditional 
immunity analysis may support desirable institutional values, they do not reflect 
current law. No matter how tempting, international lawyers should avoid fulfilling 
our satirized tendency to mistake the many gaps in international law as sites for the 
projection of our personal and institutional desires and ambitions.188 The 
invocation of fundamental values to justify applying new rules of international law 
may be a legitimate political tactic, but it should not be advanced as a legal one.189  
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3.1.3. Values: Functionalism is Dead! Long Live Functionalism! 
The contribution by scholars advocating progressive interpretations of the current 
law on UN immunity are most powerful as political arguments advocating the 
need for law reform. The law relating to UN immunity was created at the time of 
the Organization’s genesis and has achieved gospel-like status despite the fact that 
the international community has long since abandoned belief in the UN as ‘a kind 
of secular God for the international community.’190 It is increasingly recognized 
that international institutions are capable of all manner of missteps, omissions and 
sins, including in some cases human rights violations.191 Even if it is not yet 
reflected in conventional or customary law, there is a very good argument that the 
principle of absolute immunity is a historical anomaly that has outlasted its utility.  
The problem with engaging with the question of due process in terms of 
existing law on UN immunity is that the artefact becomes the agent. By focusing 
on immunity law for the source and limits of UN accountability, international 
lawyers risk missing the point, akin to looking for the keys where the lamp is 
shining. As things stand, the current state of the law creates much heat, but sheds 
very little light on the issue of UN accountability. While immunity remains a very 
important guarantor of the UN’s political and financial independence, the UN 
must look beyond legal boundaries when determining the appropriate scope of its 
accountability. In the Haiti cholera context, it is clear that a statement that claims 
against the UN are ‘not receivable’, even if technically legally accurate, does very 
little to overcome the widespread impression that the UN has done something 
wrong and that this wrong needs to be in some way addressed. As Jan Klabbers 
aptly describes it, the Haitian cholera outbreak is ultimately ‘a remarkable signpost 
for the poverty of the law’.192 
 
3.2. THE DIGNITARIAN MODEL: EVALUATING THE QUEST FOR TORTIOUS 
LIABILITY 
 
The present legal framework governing the international responsibility of 
international organizations has been described as ‘leaving individuals out in the 
cold’.193 In the Haiti cholera context, it is undeniable that the victims of the 
cholera outbreak have been marginalized. Faced with UN refusal to set up any 
internal mechanism, lawyers representing the cholera victims and their families 
have commenced a class action against the UN and relevant officials in the 
Southern District of New York. The plaintiffs seek compensatory and punitive 
damages to remedy the injuries, including US$2.2 billion that the Haitian 
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government requires to remedy Haiti’s waterways, provide adequate sanitation and 
eradicate cholera.194  
The initiation of the tort action on behalf of Haiti cholera victims has 
received support in the academic literature.195 Applying a due process analysis, I 
take a different view. In the following section, I will consider the extent to which 
tort liability is capable of fulfilling dignitarian aims of due process. In particular, I 
question (a) whether class actions are capable of developing and enriching notions 
of international community; (b) the effectiveness of tort law as a legal regulator of 
international organizations; and (c) the appropriateness of transplanting the 
corrective justice values underlying tort law to the UN setting.  
 
3.2.1. Community: Constructing Community through ‘Class Action’ in Domestic Courts 
An action in tort is on its face a prototypical example of the dignitarian model of 
due process. The key significance of handing the problem over to tort litigation is 
that it individualizes the problem. The focus of tort law is squarely on the 
interpersonal relationship between tort-feasor and victim. A concept of equality 
underpins tort law, which bases the duty to compensate on the notion that two 
parties are ‘juridically equal’, such that neither should interfere with the freedom of 
the other to pursue their own projects and purposes.196  
Where the tort action is in the nature of a class action against the United 
Nations, the interpersonal relationship at the heart of tort liability is challenged in 
two important respects. First, the defendant is not an individual but the UN, an 
international organization that — far from being in a position of juridical equality 
— is considered accountable precisely because it is in a position of juridical 
inequality owing special responsibilities to a vulnerable population. This issue will 
be dealt with in the next section as an issue of applicable law. Secondly, the 
plaintiff is not an individual, but (in the Haiti cholera case) the legal representatives 
of a ‘class’ comprising over 5,000 individuals ‘who have been or will be injured… 
or… killed by cholera contracted in Haiti on or after October 9, 2010’. The 
potential for a class action of this nature to enhance the autonomy and interest 
representation of individuals in international society is open to question. 
Mass tort actions are commonly regarded as poor vehicles for 
accountability.197 The US class action litigation system itself is described as 
afflicted by accountability problems.198 Class actions almost invariably come into 
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being through the actions of lawyers, as was the case in the Haiti cholera 
controversy, and many mass tort claims are only remotely connected with 
individuals. Class actions are widely known as ‘lawyer actions’, while the 
individuals represented ‘often are recruited by class counsel, play no client role 
whatsoever, and – when deposed to test the adequacy of representation – 
commonly show no understanding of their litigation.’199 A class action, once 
created, takes on a significant institutional life of its own, to the extent individual 
claimants have limited capacity to exit or opt out of the litigation.200 Professor 
Nagareda argued throughout his scholarship that the modern class action has 
come to operate as a ‘decidedly inferior rival’ to public lawmaking, where lawyers 
appropriate rather than realize each claimant’s autonomy over their day in court.201 
The point of referring to such literature is not to level accusations at lawyers 
in the Haiti cholera controversy, but to sound a broader note of caution. Lawyers 
representing cholera victims acknowledge they have taken the tort action as a 
mechanism of ‘last resort’.202 They do not regard the tort litigation as the best 
approach, but have been forced to resort to such litigation as a ‘nuclear option’ 
advocacy technique. Class options have been recognized in other contexts as a 
‘useful tin-opener’ or publicity vehicle for pressure groups and crusading lawyers 
hoping to open up dark and windowless areas of public administration.203 In 
working toward a due process model for the UN context, it is clear class action 
tort litigation should not be regarded as a legally desirable remedy, but (at best) as 
a step in the political battle for compensation. 
 
3.2.2. Law: Tort Law as Global Regulator (Whither Human Rights?) 
The implications of the extension of tort law to the UN context are unknown and 
largely untested. In its study on the Accountability of International Organizations, 
the International Law Association acknowledged that the law on responsibility for 
the tortious acts of peacekeepers is ‘underdeveloped.’204 Yet, arguably, the ILA is 
getting ahead of itself. An important question remains over whether tort liability has 
a role in enhancing UN accountability. At the domestic level, the role of tort law 
continues to be a subject of exceptionally active philosophical inquiry.205 There are 
muscular theories of tort law explaining its role in regulating relations between 
individuals, including, most prominently, the traditional mainstream ‘corrective 
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justice’ account206 and economic theories of tort law building in instrumentalist 
rationales of deterrence and efficiency.207 Yet, even in domestic contexts, the basis 
for the extension of tort liability to governmental authorities is in question. 
Scholars acknowledge that there does not yet exist a satisfactory theoretical 
explanation for the extension of tort law to public authorities.208 Mainstream tort 
theory is concerned with interpersonal rights, constructed as a form of moral 
theory, not as a form of political theory, concerned with the powers and duties of 
government and the relationship between government and citizen.209  
In considering the extension of tort law to the UN context, a gulf opens up 
between the home turf of tort law, based on equality (corrective justice theory) 
and the desire to deter risky behaviour (economic theory), and the natural habitat 
of the UN, where the UN is almost invariably placed into relationships with 
vulnerable populations, and where risk and compromise of individual rights in the 
interests of international security are less impediments than imperatives to UN 
action. Professor Cane has offered the most persuasive rationale for extension of 
tort liability to the public sphere, proposing that the concept of accountability 
could provide an attractive theoretical framework.210 Yet an action for damages 
has been recognized as a ‘very poor weapon’ for investigating whether public 
bodies have behaved well or badly.211 Tort law has been deemed an inefficient 
regulator and an ineffective deterrent in the public context, were the threat of 
damages claims builds in ‘decision traps’ rendering policy and decision-making 
more difficult and less rational and creating a ‘chill-effect’ on decision-taking with 
the most likely response being a ‘greater dose of bureaucratic inertia.’212 
Tort law is often contrasted negatively with human rights law in determining 
the appropriate body of law to regulate public authorities. In the consciousness of 
many international lawyers, questions of tort law and human rights law have 
become merged on account of a focus on the US Alien Tort Statute (‘ATS’), which 
funnels an increasingly narrow set of human rights claims through a tortious 
process. The Georges litigation is not brought under the ATS, though has been 
praised as ‘the perfect set of facts for a national court finally to recognise that the 
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UN cannot avoid its human rights obligations by hiding behind the cloak of 
immunity.’213 In most tort litigation, human rights is a red herring.  
Where the aim is to hold a public authority to account, it is arguable that 
cases should be funnelled away from the tort route to be dealt with in the context 
of the human rights framework. Tort and human rights differ markedly in terms 
of (i) the nature of the central relationship; (ii) the duty of care; and (iii) the 
standard of care. It is well rehearsed, both in this article and elsewhere, that tort 
law establishes a bi-polar relationship between two parties who are regarded as 
‘juridically equal’. By contrast, the aim of human rights law is less a targeting of 
negligent individuals than the targeting of the systems in which they operate.214 On 
account of the fact that tort law and human rights law were developed to address 
different relationships, the regimes take quite different approaches to the duty and 
standard of care. In tort law, the trend has been to narrow the scope of duties 
owed by public authorities.215 By contrast, human rights law goes well beyond 
prohibiting the infliction of harm, but makes public authorities answerable for the 
infringement of extensive ‘positive’ duties, reflecting an understanding of the state 
as bearing special responsibilities in respect of those over whom it exercises 
authority, different from the responsibilities individuals owe each other.216 In 
terms of standard of care, the test of reasonableness in the tort context determines 
the balance between security and freedom that ought to govern the relations 
between two individuals entitled to pursue their own interests, while 
proportionality works with a more complex balance between the importance of 
the public objective pursued by the defendant public authority and the seriousness 
of its impact on the right-holder.  
These differences are of course not accidental, but speak to the fact that, 
while tort law is designed to resolve conflicts between individual rights-holders, 
human rights law is designed to give effect to the ‘special normative relationship 
between states and their citizens’ and the distributional questions that arise 
therefrom.217 That is not to say that a public official or public authority should 
never be subject to tort liability. The aim is to separate those claims aimed at 
vindicating rights in exactly the same way as remedies granted against private 
persons, from those aimed at ensuring the proper exercise of public functions or 
securing a just distribution of society’s common resources.218 In other words, the 
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aim is to disentangle claims for corrective justice from those implicating questions 
of distributive justice. 
 
3.2.3. Values: Corrective or Distributive Justice?  
As highlighted above, the benefit of tort liability in dignitarian terms is the capacity 
of tort law to individualize the claim. Yet the problem of vindicating what are 
essentially public or human rights claims through tort liability is that it ignores the 
social or public dimension of the claim. The line between corrective and 
distributive justice is often used by tort lawyers to delineate the province of tort 
law from forms of resource allocation left more appropriately to political organs. 
While corrective justice ‘operates on entitlements without addressing the justice of 
the underlying distribution’,219 distributive justice is concerned with the proper 
distribution of the benefits and burdens that are held in common by all who 
belong to a community.  
The problem with extension of mass tort liability to the UN context is that it 
cannot help but implicate questions of distributive justice. This is closely 
connected to the question of remedy. There is much general agreement among 
tort lawyers that the primary objective of tort law is compensation.220 Non-
compensatory non-monetary remedies are exceptional and more-or-less 
controversial.221 Jane Stapleton has noted that one effect of the extension of tort 
law to public authorities has been to channel a disproportionate burden of liability 
to deep-pocketed secondary actors, straining notions of causation and 
proximity.222 Tort law is re-imagined as a public-spirited undertaking for the 
protection of vulnerable parties, inviting the expansion of tort law beyond its 
logical boundaries of corrective justice and into the territory of distributive 
justice.223 
Particular problems arise in the case of mass tort claims in a realm of scarce 
resources. Much has been made of the paradox that the chance of getting a 
compensation payout following a traffic accident implicating UN officials would 
be higher than in the present case of UN negligence leading to a cholera outbreak 
killing almost 9,000 individuals and affecting hundreds of thousands of people. 
Yet the very scale of the injury may sensibly be a factor counting against tort 
liability. Large tort awards implicate not only a determination of the resources to 
be distributed to past victims of UN conduct, but also the amount to be taken 
away from future beneficiaries. It has been calculated that the total award to Haiti 
cholera victims in a successful tort claim would be between U.S.$15 billion and 
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U.S.$36.5 billion.224 When considered against the total proposed 2016-2017 U.N. 
biennium budget of U.S.$24.7 billion, the scale of the problem becomes clear.225 
Domestic tort judgments against the UN are a drain on scarce resources, 
threatening to seriously reduce the funds available to achieve UN purposes and 
potentially to multiply the victims of the same tortious act well beyond the context 
of the tort.  
The central task of a domestic judge processing a tort claim is to rectify an 
injustice that has occurred between the doer and the sufferer of harm, not to 
distribute goods according to a more proportional criterion, comparing the relative 
merits of the participants in a political co-op as diverse and under-serviced as the 
international community. In many mass tort class actions, the final scheme for 
resolving claims essentially becomes an administrative process administered by 
judges, who (at least in the context of the asbestos litigation) have freely admitted 
they are an inefficient surrogate for the state.226 Once again, the human rights 
framework arguably offers a more appropriate set of remedies. Judges in the 
domestic context have noted that individuals who have suffered at the hands of 
public authorities are not necessarily primarily motivated by a desire for monetary 
compensation, but institute proceedings because they want ‘faceless persons in an 
apparently insensitive, unresponsive and impenetrable bureaucratic labyrinth…to 
acknowledge that something has gone wrong, to provide them with an 
explanation, an apology and an assurance that steps have been taken to ensure (so 
far as possible in an imperfect world) that the same mistake will not happen 
again.’227 A measure of compensation can play an important role in providing 
recognition to victims, however it has been argued that damages should be ‘on the 
low side’, at least by comparison to torts cases.228 This is in consideration of the 
fact that remedies for human rights violations should correspond, not only to the 
circumstances of the individual victim, but to what would serve the interests of the 
‘wider public who have an interest in the continued funding of the public 
service’.229 I will expand further upon this below. 
 
3.3. THE PUBLIC INTEREST MODEL AND HAITI CHOLERA: EVALUATING THE 
QUEST FOR ACCOUNTABILITY 
 
In contrast to the sanctions context, no procedural framework has been adopted 
or proposed that would fit a public interest model of due process. There is a stale 
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cache of available mechanisms to receive third party claims, chief among them the 
standing claims commission contemplated in the Model SOFA (and indeed the 
SOFA between the UN and Haiti), mothballed and ultimately rendered skeletal 
through disuse. The only standing claims commission thought to have been 
established in the short history of UN peacekeeping was developed to investigate 
claims against KFOR and UNMIK in Kosovo, though a Human Rights Watch 
Report concluded that ‘few people… even knew that the body existed, including 
the majority of UNMIK staff’.230 More often, there has been a tendency to resolve 
claims on an ad hoc rather than a systematic basis, with the former head of the UN 
division that routinely handled third-party claims maintaining that such claims 
‘have usually been amicably resolved – without recourse to arbitration’ or resolved 
through local claims review boards.231 These internal administrative processes 
leave the investigation, processing and final adjudication of claims entirely in the 
hands of the Organization, raising clear questions of independence where, as the 
UN itself has recognized, the UN ‘may be perceived as acting as a judge in its own 
case.’232 
It is clear that fresh thinking is needed to address the accountability deficit in 
UN decision-making. UN accountability is not synonymous with legal 
responsibility or tort liability. My discussion in this final section focuses in on the 
values that should underlie any procedural framework. As no mechanisms have yet 
been created in the Haiti cholera context, discussion can only be aspirational, 
however in my view this (rather than continuing bouts about the scope of UN 
immunity) should be the central focus of future detailed inquiry both within the 
UN and outside it.  
 
3.3.1. Community: The Shift from Public to Publicness 
In a model based on accountability, an obvious question requiring an answer is 
‘accountability to whom’? The answer, far from being obvious in the UN context, 
is complex. As Donaldson and Kingsbury have recognized, there are major 
challenges with identifying a clearly defined ‘public’ for entities operating in the 
global sphere.233 The idea that the UN is accountable only to the P5, or to 
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member states, is clearly outdated.234 Yet, the danger of opening up the notion of 
community to a ‘multiplicity of publics’ in accordance with a more contemporary 
conception of international community is that any accountability mechanism risks 
ending up with the UN beholden to the interests and preferences of the most 
powerful and organized elites.  
Given the disaggregated and unsettled scope of the international community, 
a more productive line of inquiry is to shift attention from accountability to 
‘whom’ to ask accountability to ‘what’? There is often a presumption that 
accountability processes are founded on a clear agreement about the standards in 
relation to which the decision-maker is being held to account.235 However, where 
accountability is sought outside the context of the democratic state, the process of 
holding a decision-maker to account entails within it a process of debating what 
the standards should be.236 Buchanan and Keohane criticize a ‘narrow’ form of 
accountability in the global governance context, without provision for contestation 
of the terms of accountability.237 This narrow accountability is insufficient because 
the legitimacy of global governance institutions depends in part upon whether they 
operate to facilitate ongoing, principled, factually informed deliberation about the 
terms of accountability.  
The public interest model therefore posits an ‘ideal-evolving’ conception of 
community.238 The focus is not so much on the scope of the public as on the 
scope of public participation that will enable a panel to gauge what is in the ‘public 
interest’. The important point is that broad participation must be, not merely 
encouraged, but channelled. The aim is to encourage participants to infuse their 
claims with a sense of what is good for all, rather than encouraging self-interested 
claims. It is not enough to leave this to an open pluralist dialogue. Kristina 
Daugirdas has engaged in an interesting analysis of the power of ‘transnational 
discourse’, involving interaction between governments, inter-governmental 
organizations, NGOs, national courts, experts and stakeholders, invoking its 
capacity to exact reputational costs.239 However, for powerless actors who are not 
the ECJ in Kadi, this form of discourse risks collapsing into a form of 
decaffeinated dignitarianism where the result is not dialogue, but a stonewalled 
monologue. Indeed, Daugirdas’ conclusions ring hollow in the Haiti cholera 
context, where she recognizes that ‘[t]here has been no objective or authoritative 
determination that the UN’s conduct in connection with Haiti has violated 
international law – and there may never be.’240 Though local trust has been eroded 
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and animosity toward the UN in Haiti has at times been palpable,241 ultimately the 
UN has proved ‘too big to f(l)ail’, particularly while the vulnerable Haitian 
population remains reliant on its assistance. It is clear that the UN context would 
benefit from the creation of a designated forum that ensures, not merely inclusive 
discourse, but crucially UN responsiveness. 
 
3.3.2. Law: Account-giving, Answerability, Responsiveness 
Accountability has been described as ‘the ultimate principle for the new age of 
governance in which the exercise of power has transcended the boundaries of the 
nation state.’242 In this study, I am interested not so much in accountability as a 
virtue or attribute of good governance, but rather as a process. The challenge is to 
develop a ‘vessel for normativity’ or a centralized due process mechanism with the 
capacity to distil appropriate standards responsive to the felt needs of the 
international public.243 The model draws on theories of law such as Nonet and 
Selznick’s responsive law, Brunee and Toope’s ‘interactional theory’ of 
international legal obligation and Johnstone’s ‘deliberative’ model, each complex 
theories at the heart of which is the recognition that influential norms will not 
emerge in the absence of processes that allow for active participation of relevant 
social actors. As with each of these theories, participatory decision-making is the 
hallmark of the public interest model of due process, where participation acts as ‘a 
source of knowledge, a vehicle of communication, and a foundation for consent’ 
and social pressure acts as an opportunity for self-correction.244  
Under a public interest model of due process, the challenge is to develop 
institutional processes that are open and responsive to public participation, 
through which the public interest can be measured and articulated and, in turn, 
exposed to public scrutiny. Certain innovative scholars have already begun the 
process of inquiry.245 By way of preliminary contribution, I wish simply to draw 
out the central elements of an accountability mechanism. According to the 
broader scholarship, account-giving usually comprises at least three elements or 
stages.246 First, to qualify as ‘account-giving’, there must be an information-
gathering stage or public inquiry in the course of which the panel gathers relevant 
information, including (though by no means limited to) inquiry into the actor’s 
conduct and justifications for that conduct. Secondly, to build in ‘answerability’, 
there must be a possibility for the panel to enter a reasoned and public judgment of the 
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account. Third, to build in ‘responsiveness’, the forum may reach a decision about 
consequences that arise from such a judgment, including a fair remedy where the 
actor’s justification is found inadequate. The challenge for the UN is to devise a 
forum that builds in these elements of account-giving, answerability and 
responsiveness.  
 
3.3.3. Values: The Value(s) of Accountability 
In the Haiti cholera context, there has been something of an over-emphasis on 
judicial compensation as the route to UN accountability. Yet in scholarship on 
mass reparations following human rights violations, scholars argue that what is 
important is not the level of compensation, but rather the capacity of reparations 
programs to achieve important goals such as social solidarity, civic trust and 
recognition.247 Here, we look in further detail at the processes of public inquiry, 
public judgment and fair remedy to examine how they might achieve these goals. 
In a society as divided and stratified as the international community, a public 
inquiry can play an important (if modest) role as a catalyst for greater social 
solidarity. A public inquiry provides an important opportunity to give concrete 
expression to the central commitments and values of international society. The 
role of such an inquiry must be two-fold, encompassing information-gathering and 
engagement. In terms of information-gathering, the panel must investigate with 
relevant parties the nature of the UN’s conduct as well as justifications for its 
conduct. Yet, in addition to seeking direct participation from relevant actors, it 
must also remain engaged with the multiple public spheres that coalesce around 
the UN, through which opinions are developed and exchanged. There is a body of 
empirical work establishing that such networks can be the venue for meaningful 
and knowledgeable deliberation about decision-making beyond the level of the 
nation state, including in Europe and globally.248 The task of digesting these 
viewpoints is not an arduous one and can be indirect. For example, in the 
sanctions context, it is a task already routinely carried out by the Analytical 
Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team. Through information-gathering and 
engagement, an inquiry becomes a search, not for objectively right answers, but 
for ‘inter-subjective’ or collective interpretation of the terms upon which the UN 
should be held accountable.249     
Another important goal of any accountability mechanism is the formation or 
restoration of civic trust in the UN as an institution. Local trust has been described 
as the most important capital for any UN peacekeeper.250 As Louise Arbour and 
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Mac Darrow noted, ‘[t]he UN has an especially high onus to discharge so as to be 
taken seriously… [I]ts effectiveness in encouraging compliance with human rights 
norms lies in the balance, as does its very legitimacy.’251 Where the UN has 
engaged in unfair or unlawful action that has caused harm to individuals, a public 
judgment to this effect serves as an acknowledgement of its wrongfulness and as a 
spur to the UN against non-repetition. The act of reason-giving serves a 
‘disciplining function’, increasing pressure on participants to justify their claims by 
reference to the public interest, and producing a judgment that all subject to them 
can accept, at least in principle.252 
Where the actor’s justification is found to be inadequate, a measure of 
individual compensation serves as an important recognition of those harmed, not 
only as members of groups, but also as irreplaceable and unsubstitutable human 
beings.253 That is not to say that the measure of compensation must always be 
judicial compensation in proportion to harm. As discussed above, this can have 
pernicious effects, particularly where scarcity of resources makes it unfeasible to 
satisfy simultaneously the claims of all victims and of other sectors of society that 
also require attention. While international law recognizes an individual’s right to a 
remedy for human rights violations,254 there is a huge contextual gap between 
affirmation of the legal right and its satisfaction.255 In the UN context, there are a 
number of advantages to a well-designed reparations program over judicial 
compensation, including lower costs, relaxed standards of evidence, non-
adversarial procedures and the virtual certainty that accompanies administrative 
reparations programs.256 Creative solutions may also be needed to determine how 
the UN can build capacity to meet these claims in the future.257 
 
 
 
4. CONCLUSION 
 
This article invites greater attention to the question of due process in UN 
decision-making, recognizing the issue as one of far greater significance than the 
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prosaic terminology of ‘process’ might suggest. Sites in which the UN has 
assumed decision-making authority affecting individuals are exemplars of an 
emerging system of international governance. The task of constructing a 
procedural framework for a new tier of governance represents a far greater 
theoretical and practical challenge for the international legal order than has so far 
been acknowledged. 
The central tenet of this article is that the task of developing a due process 
framework has been under-theorized. The great majority of procedural reform 
proposals have relied on traditional international law source methodology to 
develop a universal set of due process principles drawing on legal safeguards 
developed for domestic legal settings. The problem with this classical formalist 
methodological approach to the development of international legal principles is 
that it can tend to overemphasize the value of (descriptive) state practice to the 
detriment of (normative) theoretical appeal. The value of the descriptive route is 
that it focuses on what state practice has been, and ensures international legal 
principles correspond to the reality of state conduct.258 However, the history of 
due process has largely unfolded in response to domestic legal contexts, a practice 
that is arguably unsuited to the quite different legal and political context of global 
governance institutions such as the UN. Rather than working from practice to 
theory, the inverse is more appropriate, with the principal aim being to provide 
strong and enduring theoretical foundations to support UN institutional practice.  
In this article, I recognize three different procedural models advancing 
different process values. Applied to the UN context, it can be seen that these 
models are supported by different procedural frameworks and impact in different 
ways on conceptions of international community, international law and the 
international value system. I summarize in the table at the end of this article the 
major implications of the various models. Though I take the position in both the 
sanctions and Haiti cholera context that the public interest model is best equipped 
to advance legitimacy, the significant difference of opinion on the future direction 
of the international legal order means that minds will legitimately differ over the 
most appropriate model in different contexts. The aim of this article is not to 
foreclose debate, but to stimulate thinking against the backdrop of a value-based 
understanding of due process.  
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Table II. Table summarizing impact of different normative models of due process 
 
 
 Key Process 
Value 
Key 
Participants 
Theory of 
International 
Law 
Key 
International 
Value 
Key 
Procedural 
Actor 
Instrumentalist Accuracy Nation States 
 
Classical 
Positivist 
 
Legal 
Responsibility 
Internationalised 
Court 
 
Dignitarian Interest 
Representation 
Stakeholders Pluralist Liability Domestic/ 
Regional Courts 
Public Interest Public 
Interest 
International 
Community 
Cosmopolitan 
Constitutionalist 
Accountability UN 
Ombudsperson 
(sanctions)/ 
Reparations 
Commission 
(Haiti) 
